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Wireless Broadband oﬀers incredibly fast, “always on” Internet similar to ADSL and sets the user free from the ﬁxed access areas. In
ordertoachievethesefeaturesstandardisationwasachievedforWirelessLAN(WLANs)andWirelessMetropolitanAreaNetworks
(WMANs) with the advent of IEEE802.11 and IEEE802.16 family of standards, respectively. One serious concern in the rapidly
developing wireless networking market has been the security of the deployments since the information is delivered freely in the
air and therefore privacy and integrity of the transmitted information, along with the user-authentication procedures, become a
very important issue. In this article, we present the security characteristics for the WiFi and the WiMAX networks. We thoroughly
present the security mechanisms along with a threat analysis for both IEEE 802.11 and the 802.16 as well as their amendments. We
summarise in a comparative manner the security characteristics and the possible residual threats for both standards. Finally focus
on the necessary actions and conﬁgurations that are needed in order to deploy WiFi and WiMAX with increased levels of security
and privacy.
1.Introduction
In 1997, the initial form of the 802.11 protocol was presented
[1]. Since then, various amended protocols have been added.
The reason was the demand for higher data rates, diﬀerent
modulationsandfrequencytransmissions,improvedQuality
of Service (QoS), enhanced security and authentication
mechanisms. When the technology was brought to the
market, there were concerns if products from diﬀerent ven-
dors could meet interoperability.
This issue was addressed with the formation of an indus-
try consortium named Wireless Fidelity Alliance (WiFi).
WiFi Alliance implemented a test suite to certify interop-
erability for the adopted 802.11b products. The 802.11b
protocol [2], an amendment of the initial 802.11, operates in
theISMbandwithdataratesupto11Mbps,ininfrastructure
and in ad-hoc mode for client-to-client connections.
Later on, the IEEE 802.11g was introduced and certiﬁed
as a continuity and extension of the 802.11b. 802.11g ope-
rates in the same frequency range with data rates up to
54Mbps [3], providing compatibility with 802.11b devices.
The higher data rates achieved with the usage of a wider
range of modulation options. Another important amend-
ment was the IEEE 802.11i protocol [4], in which, newer
and stronger security and authentication mechanisms were
added in order to address security deﬁciencies that were
presented in WiFi.
After the commercial success of the standard-based
equipment and the thriving demand for broadband wireless
access, the vision of networks covering larger areas and
extended services was the next undertake of the IEEE. As a
consequence in 2001, the 802.16 standard was introduced;
initially its scope was to solve the “last mile” problem.
While the 802.11 protocol oﬀers service for few hundred
meters range and only for a few users, the new IEEE 802.16
standard was designed for deploying Wireless Metropolitan
Area Networks (WMAN) and thereby it can provide services
to hundreds or thousands of users, in a point-to-point (PP)
or point-to-multipoint (PMP) setting.
In June 2004, the standard was ratiﬁed under the
title “IEEE 802.16-2004 Standard for Local and Metropoli-
tan Area Networks Part 16: Air Interface for Fixed and
Broadband Wireless Access Systems” [5]. This protocol
was an amendment of the earliest version 802.16-20012 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
with the integration of the 802.16a-2003 and the 802.16c-
2002 standards. In 2005, the IEEE introduced the 802.16e-
2005 amendment and the 802.16-2004 Corrigendum [6],
which provide mobility along with enhanced security and
authentication mechanisms. The initial speciﬁcation was for
ﬁxed users, designed to operate in the 10–66 GHzfrequency
range. The new modiﬁcations for ﬁxed and nomadic users
include mesh and Non-Line-Of-Sight (NLOS) by adding
coverage in the 2–11GHz range.
The inherent QoS parameters in the standard include
minimum traﬃc rate, maximum latency and tolerated jitter,
helpingthustheusageoflow-tolerantservicessuchvoiceand
streaming video. Additionally, the standard provides services
to support both Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and
packet services. ATM is important because of its role in
telecomcarrierinfrastructuresinceitisoftenusedtosupport
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) services. ATM is also widely
used to support voice transmissions. The packet operation in
the 802.16 standard supports the IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, and
Virtual LAN (VLAN) services.
The IEEE 802.16 currently employs the most sophis-
ticated technology solutions in the wireless world, and
correspondingly it guarantees performance in terms of
covered area, bit-rate, and QoS. In order to spread the use
of the 802.16 standard solutions, verify the interoperability
of 802.16 devices built by diﬀerent manufacturers and certify
interoperable devices, an analogous to WiFi consortium
of wireless device manufacturers was created named as
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX)
[7]. As wireless broadband technology has become very
popular, the introduction of WiMAX will increase the
demand for wireless broadband access in the ﬁxed and the
mobile devices. This development makes wireless security a
very serious concern.
Although the functional characteristics of the 802.11 and
the 802.16 are diﬀerent, they do have some similarities in
their architecture structure. One of them, the basis of the
protocol functionality, is the mechanism of the Wireless
Medium Access Control (MAC) and the Physical Layer
(PHY) speciﬁcation. The similarity in the structure of the
MAC and the PHY layer will derive substantial results from
the comparison of the two standards.
This article is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 2.1
we provide a thorough description of the security mecha-
nismsfortheIEEE802.11,the802.16andtheiramendments.
Section 2.2 we summarise the security overview for WiFi
and WiMAX is provided. In Section 3, we analyse the
residual threats for the two standards. Due to the fact
that the 802.11 protocol has many years of operation, an
analytical description of the already known vulnerabilities
is provided. On the other hand, the security mechanisms of
the IEEE 802.16 and its amendments have not been tested
in actual conditions for a substantial amount of time, as
it is a relatively new technology, not deployed widely to
determine possible serious threats and vulnerability issues.
Therefore, the IEEE 802.16 threat analysis will be based
on the already registered threats from the 802.11 and any
possible operational weaknesses that might come up after
the scrutinized analysis of the 802.16 security mechanisms.
Section 3.1 summarizes in a nutshell the possible threats for
bothstandardsalongwiththeiramendmentsandSection 3.2
of this article we provide guidelines for usage and deploy-
ment of infrastructure design and optimal conﬁguration for
WiFi and WiMAX. Finally, in Section 5.1 we conclude and
discuss the related open research challenges and the work
that should be done in the future.
2.WiFiSecurityMechanisms
Every security mechanism for wireless transmission is built
to provide three basic functions: (i) Authentication to verify
the identity of the authorized communicating client stations;
(ii) conﬁdentiality (Privacy) to secure that the wirelessly
conveyed information will remain private and protected;
(iii) integrity to secure that the transmitted MPDU from
a source will arrive at its destination intact, without being
modiﬁed. Authentication operates at the Link Level between
WiFi stations. Conﬁdentiality and Integrity is implemented
in the MAC security sublayer, just a level higher from the
PHY layer.
2.1. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). The ﬁrst security
mechanism was the Wired Equivalent Privacy or Wireless
Encryption Protocol (WEP). WEP has the following func-
tions to implement the aforementioned security functions.
2.1.1. Conﬁdentiality (Privacy). WEP uses the RC4 encryp-
tion algorithm. RC4 is a stream cipher that operates by
expanding a short key into an inﬁnite pseudo-random key
stream. The station XORs the key stream with the plaintext
and produces the cipher text. The ﬁrst deﬁnition was the
WEP-40 due to the use of a 40-bit shared key. Many vendors
increased the key size to 104bits providing the WEP-104.
To avoid encrypting two texts with the same key-stream,
an Initialization Vector (IV) is used to enhance the shared
secret key and create a diﬀerent key (WEP seed) for each
packet. The IV ﬁeld is 32bits long and contains three
subﬁelds. The ﬁrst contains the 24bit IV, the second a 2-bit
Key Identiﬁer and the third a 6-bit Pad subﬁeld. The 24-bit
IV size gives a total of 64 or 124bits key. The encryption-
decryption task remains the same despite the key size (see
Figure 1). RC4 receives the payload concatenated with the
Integrity Check Value (ICV) (Analysis for the WEP-ICV
follows in “WEP Integrity” session) at the end, and encrypts
it with the 64 or the 124bit key described earlier. At its
destination the message ﬁrstly gets decrypted. The receiver
with the shared key that it possesses and with the IV from
the received MPDU will decrypt the encrypted payload and
ICV.
2.1.2. Integrity. To ensure the integrity of the MPDU data,
WEP uses the Integrity Check Value (ICV) mechanism. ICV
implements a 32bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-32).
For each transmitted MPDU payload, the CRC checksum is
computed and concatenated at the end of the MPDU. Both
the payload and the ICV are encrypted with the RC4 cipher.
At its destination the message is decrypted and the CRCJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 3
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Figure 2: 4-way message authentication.
of the arrived payload is computed. If the CRC, which was
produced by the source and it was sent with the message,
is the same with the recomputed CRC, the message is valid
and is forwarded to the Link Layer; otherwise, the message
indicates integrity violation and it is discarded.
2.1.3. Authentication. WEP has two types of authentication:
Open and Shared key. Open authentication actually is a non-
authentication procedure since the AP accepts every station
without identity veriﬁcation. Thus, the station in a two-
message exchange with the AP provides its identity and the
request to authenticate. The AP responds with a message
conﬁrming successful authentication.
Shared key authentication (see Figure 2) requires the
knowledge of a secret key to join the network. The key
knowledge implies that the station is a trustful entity, and
therefore authorized. The way that the key is obtained from a
client station is not an issue for WEP. Another secure way
must be implemented to ensure that only trusted entities
will have this key. If the station possesses the key, it begins
a four-way message exchange to achieve authentication. The
ﬁrst message from a station declares its MAC address and the
authentication request. AP replies with a generated string,
ﬁxedat128octets,asachallengetext.Thethirdmessagefrom
station will send this challenge back to AP encrypted with an
RC4 encryption, along withtheICV. TheAP de-encapsulates4 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
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Figure 3: WPA MPDU Format.
the encrypted frame, checks the decrypted ICV, and if it is
successful,the AP compares the received decrypted challenge
text with the 128-byte message that was sent from it with the
second message. If the two texts are the same, AP sends the
last message for successful authentication. In any other case
where ICV does not match or the challenge comparison is
diﬀerent, the AP notiﬁes for unsuccessful authentication and
rejects the station.
2.2. WiFi Protected Access (WPA). It was proved that WEP
does not provide adequate security. Some of the WEP
weaknesses are the following
(i) RC4 has a weak key schedule [8].
(ii) The cryptographic key and the IV are short and
cannot be automatically and frequently updated.
(iii) CRC-32 is not capable of providing integrity as linear
codes are susceptible to attacks on data integrity.
For the aforementioned reasons WiFi introduced the WiFi
Protected Access (WPA) to enhance WEP. WPA is a part
of the 802.11i standard, and it is designed to allow legacy
equipment with WEP security to upgrade their ﬁrmware.
WPA uses the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
for conﬁdentiality and integrity while for authentication
it additionally uses the 802.1X authentication protocol
mechanism.
2.2.1. TKIP Conﬁdentiality. TKIP like WEP uses the RC4
cipher for encryption-decryption. To reinforce security,
TKIP doubles the IV ﬁeld to 48bits. This 48-bit ﬁeld is
used as a per-MPDU TKIP Sequence Counter (TSC), to
create a packet sequence during transmission. If the receiver
detectsthataMPDUdoesnotfollowtheincreasingreception
sequence, it drops the packet. This mechanism enhances
security to replay attacks. The key mixing function is more
complicated and it strengthens encryption. It generates a
unique encryption key for each MPDU frame by combining
the Temporal Key (TK), the Transmit Address (TA), and
the TSC for the WEP seed. The WEP seed, which produced
from the aforementioned parameters, operates just like the
WEP IV, and with the RC4 key it creates the key stream.
The encrypted parts of the MPDU are the payload, the MIC
(analysis of MIC follows in TKIP Integrity) and the ICV (see
Figure 3).
When the message arrives at its destination, the TSC
number is checked to verify that the packet follows the
increasing reception sequence. If so, the key forms the RC4
key-stream and decrypts the encrypted parts. The next step
is the ICV check; if it is successful, the WPA integrity check
follows.
2.2.2. TKIP Integrity. TKIP uses the Message Integrity Code
(MIC) called “Michael”. MIC enhances security against
forgery attacks compared to the ICV usage in WEP. This
time MIC is applied to MSDUs, and the MIC comparison
is implemented in the MSDU-level as well. The reason is
theincreaseoftheimplementationﬂexibilitywithre-existing
WEP hardware. Michael with a 64-bit key is implemented
on the MSDU Sender and Destination Address (SA, DA), the
MSDU Priority, and the MSDU payload. MIC is 64-bit long
and it is placed at the end of the MSDU payload. Knowing
that a MSDU could be partitioned into more than one
MPDU, the integrity check for each MPDU takes place with
ICV. Then, with the concatenation of all the MSDU parts,
each MSDU is checked with Michael. If the comparison of
the decrypted MIC from the arrived MPDU, and the MIC
which is created from the receiver, are the same, the message
is valid. If not, the MSDU is discarded and measures are
taking place.
2.2.3. Authentication. WPA uses the authentication meth-
ods described in WEP. Additionally, the 802.11i standard
introduces the 802.1X authentication mechanism which is
implemented when the WPA suite is used. A thorough
analysis of the 801.1X authentication along with the Exten-
sible Authentication Protocol (EAP) requires ﬁrstly the
description of the Conﬁdentiality-Integrity mechanisms of
WPA2. Thus, the 802.1 X/EAP authentication mechanisms
will be described in then WPA2 entity.Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 5
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2.3. WPA2. The WPA2 name was given for the IEEE 802.11i
from the WiFi Alliance. It was designed to provide stronger
securitywithnewmechanismsandhardwaredeviceswithout
the WEP bindings. Attention was given so that WPA
devices could be associated with WPA2 access points. The
security in 802.11i deﬁnes the Robust Security Network
Association (RSNA), which is the indicator of the modern
secured wireless communication implementation in WiFi,
and separates security into two important modes: the pre-
RSNA with WEP and WPA and to RSNA with WPA2 as
described in this section.
2.3.1. Conﬁdentiality. WPA2 uses the Counter-Mode/Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC)-MAC Protocol (CCMP) for conﬁ-
dentiality as well as integrity. For data conﬁdentiality CCMP
uses AES in counter mode with 128 bit key and 128 bit block
size. The encrypted parts of the MPDU are the payload and
the MIC ﬁeld (see Figure 4).
2.3.2. Integrity. CCM-MAC operations expand the original
MPDUsizeby16octets—8octetsfortheCCMPHeaderﬁeld
and8octetsfortheMICﬁeld.CCMrequiresafreshtemporal
key for every session and a unique nonce value for each
frame, protected by a given temporal key. For this purpose,
a 48-bit packet number is used. CCM does not use the WEP
ICV anymore. Leaving aside the integrity protection of the
MPDU, CCM protects some Additional Authentication Data
(AAD). The AAD is constructed from the MPDU header
and it includes subﬁelds from MAC frame control, addresses
from source and destination ﬁelds, Sequence Control (SC),
QoS control ﬁeld, and therefore provides enhanced integrity
protection.
2.3.3.Authentication. ForauthenticationWPA2providesthe
strong 802.1X method, which transmits key information
betweenauthenticatorandsupplicant.IEEE802.1Xhasthree
main entities: The Supplicant (WS), the Authenticator (AP)
andtheAuthenticationserver.Theauthenticatordoesnotdo
the authentication; the Authentication server does this task
through the authenticator. Between the supplicant and the
authenticator the 802.1X protocol is implemented; between
the authenticator and the authentication server the protocol6 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
is not deﬁned. Nevertheless, RADIUS is typically used. The
EAPmethodused(defactotheEAP-TLSisused[9])byIEEE
802.1X will support mutual authentication, as the station
needs assurance that the AP is a legitimate AP.
The initial traﬃc for authentication (see Figure 5)t a k e s
place between the supplicant and the authentication server
through the uncontrolled port. Once the authentication
server authenticates the supplicant, it informs the authenti-
cator for the successful authentication and it passes keying
materialtotheauthenticator.Keymaterialexchangebetween
thesupplicantandtheauthenticatorisimplementedwiththe
Extensible Authentication Protocol over LANs (EAPOL). If
all exchanges are successful the Authenticator allows traﬃc
through the controlled port.
2.3.4. Key Derivation and Management. Due to the fact that
the 802.11i has more than one conﬁdentiality protocols, the
AP uses a ciphersuite to notify for all the data-conﬁdentiality
protocols allowed to be used (e.g., CCMP or TKIP). The
client then chooses the parameters and it sends the choices
back to the AP. The chosen parameters must match the
available options from the list; if not, the AP will deny the
association by sending a proper message. Right after the
cipher suite is chosen, the key exchange is taking place. A
key hierarchy is implemented to create keys for the EAPOL
handshaking and the WPA2 security mechanisms. There are
two key hierarchies in the 802.11i standard.
(i) Pairwise Key Hierarchy for Unicast TraﬃcP r o t e c -
tion. The ﬁrst key of the hierarchy is the 256 bit
Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The PMK derivation
depends on the authentication method used. If the
802.1X method is used, the PMK is derived from
server and the ﬁrst 256bits of the Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) key. If a pre-
shared key is used, the password is used to create the
PMK. The Pairwise key hierarchy generates the Pair-
wise Transient Key (PTK) from PMK. Some of the
parameters are the source and the transmit address,
plus, nonce from the client and the authenticator.
From PTK three keys are derived. (i) The 128 bit
EAPOL Key Conﬁrmation Key (KCK), which is used
for data origin authenticity in the authentication
procedure that follows with HMAC-MD5, or SHA-1
algorithm. (ii) The 128 bit EAPOL Key Encryption
Key (KEK), which provides traﬃc key conﬁdentiality
duringauthenticationhandshakingwithRC4,orAES
with Key Wrap. (iii) The 256 bit for TKIP or the 128
bit Temporal Key (TK) for AES-CCMP; it is used for
WPA2 conﬁdentiality.
(ii) Group Key Hierarchy for Multicast and Broadcast
Traﬃc Protection. The ﬁrst key created is the Group
Master Key (GMK), which is a random number,
which AP can periodically reinitialize it. The key
which is derived from GMK is created with a pseu-
dorandom function with parameters from GMK, the
authenticator MAC address and a nonce from the
authenticator, called Group Temporal Key (GTK). Its
length is 256 bit with TKIP, and 128 bit for CCMP.
T h et e m p o r a lk e yd e r i v e df r o mG T Ki s2 5 6b i tw i t h
TKIP, and 128 bit for CCMP and it is used for
conﬁdentiality.
Two are the EAPOL-key exchanges in the 802.11i standard:
the 4-way and the group handshake.
The supplicant and the authenticator use this handshake
to conﬁrm the existence of the PMK, verify the selection
of the cipher suite, and derive a fresh Pairwise Transient
Key (PTK) for the following data session [10]. The 4-
way handshake is comprised of 4 messages between the
supplicant and the authenticator [11] (see Figure 6).
(i) Message1.Theauthenticatorsendsanonce(ANonce)
to supplicant.
(ii) Message 2. The Supplicant creates its own nonce
(SNonce)andsendsittoauthenticator.WithANonce
and SNonce available, the supplicant calculates the
PTK. The supplicant also sends the security param-
eters that it used during association, and the message
is authenticated and veriﬁed with KCK from authen-
ticator.
(iii) Message 3. The authenticator sends the GTK enc-
rypted with KEK and the security parameters that
sent out with its beacons. The message then is
authenticated with KCK from supplicant to verify
that the information sent from authenticator is valid.
(iv) Message 4. With this message, PTKs are ready to be
used from WPA2 conﬁdentiality protocol.
With the Group key handshake, a 4-way handshake precedes
this procedure and includes the GTK conveyance in Message
3. The group key handshake updates the GTK.
(i) Message 1. The authenticator sends to the supplicant
the GTK encrypted using the KEK and the message is
subject to an authentication check.
(ii) Message 2. With this message, the group temporal
keys (GTKs) are ready to be used from the WPA2
conﬁdentiality protocol.
When clients roam between access points the result is a
decrease in system performance as the load to authentication
server is increased. A convenient way of the WPA2 to
eﬀectively resolve this issue is the key caching. With key
caching the client station and the access point retain the
security association when the client station roams to another
accesspoint.Whenaclientreturnstoanaccesspoint,itsends
the key name in the association request from AP. The client
can send more than one key name in the association request.
Iftheaccesspointsendsasuccessintheassociationresponse,
then the client and access point proceed directly to the 4-way
handshake.
After the thorough analysis of the WPA2, it must be
stressed that many modern hardware devices use AES-
CCMP in the WPA security, besides the TKIP option,
combined with shared-key authentication, instead of the
802.1X authentication that WPA2 uses. This case resemblesJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 7
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with WPA2 security and it should be referred as such, for the
following two reasons.
(1) Although WPA is a part of the 802.11i standard,
it is designed to allow legacy equipment with WEP
security to upgrade their ﬁrmware.
(2) The AES-CCMP implementation in the 802.11i
standard deﬁnes the Robust Security Network Asso-
ciation (RSNA), and indicates the modern secured
wireless communication implementation in WiFi.
3.WiMAXSecurityMechanisms
Security in 802.16/e was thoroughly designed as an impor-
tant part of the standard architecture due to the additional
possible weaknesses that wireless communication endures,
especially now where the speciﬁc network deployment is to
cover much larger areas. The security protocol is applied
in the privacy sublayer which is positioned at the bottom
of the MAC layer, and it provides mechanisms to ensure
conﬁdentiality, integrity and client authentication with the
implementation of a Key Management Protocol (PKM).
PKM provides also secure key distribution between BS and
SS. The security information set (keys and cryptographic
suites) between BS and SS is deﬁned with the implemen-
tation of the Security Association (SA). The information
included in a SA varies according to the suite it is used. The
SA maintains the security state relevant to a connection [12].
SA is identiﬁed using a 16-bit SA identiﬁer (SAID). There are
three SA types.
(i) Primary SA. Each SS entering the network establishes
an exclusive Primary SA with its BS. SS’s SAID will be
equal to the basic Connection ID (CID). The task of
thePrimarySAistomaptheSecondaryManagement
Connection.
(ii) Static SA. Static SAs are provisioned from the BS
and they are created during the initialization process
of a SS. For the basic unicast service a Static SA is
created. If a SS has subscribed to additional services,
additional SAs are created respectively. Static SAs can
be shared by multiple SSs (multicasting).
(iii) Dynamic SA. A Dynamic SA is created and termi-
nated on the ﬂy, in response to the initiation and
termination of speciﬁc service ﬂows. Like Static SAs,
Dynamic SAs can be shared by multiple SSs.
PrimaryandBasicManagementconnectionsarenotmapped
to a SA, while all transport connections are mapped to an
existing SA. The BS ensures that each SS has access only to
authorized SAs. Key synchronization between SS and BS is
regulated from PKM.
3.1. Security Mechanisms in 802.16. The PKM protocol
is used by the SS for authentication, traﬃck e ym a t e r i a l
derivation by the BS, periodic reauthorization, and key
refresh.
3.1.1. Authentication. The SS authentication is controlled
from the Authorization Finite State Machine (FSM) (see
Figure 13). The state machine consists of six stages (Start,
Authorize wait, Authorized, Reauthorize Wait, Authorize
RejectWaitandSilent),andeightdistinctevents(Communi-
cation Established, Timeout, Authorization Grace Timeout,
Reauthorize, Authorization Reply, Authorization Invalid,
Permanent Authorization Reject, Authorization Reject). In
the authentication procedure the BS handles the following
tasks.
(i) Authenticates the identity of a SS,
(ii) Assigns to the authenticated SS the SAIDs and the
properties of Primary, and Static SAs key informa-
tion,
(iii) Provides to the authenticated SS the shared secret,
a 160-bit Authorization Key (AK) to initiate the
following key management process.
The authorization process (see Figure 7) begins with
the Authentication Information message from SS to BS.8 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
The message contains the X.509 certiﬁcate which is bound
with SS’s MAC address. The certiﬁcate is issued by the
manufacturer or an external authority for the SS. The X.509
authentication service is part of the X.500 series of recom-
mendations that deﬁne a directory service. The directory is,
in eﬀect, a server or distributed set of servers that maintain
a database of information about users. The core of X.509
is the public key cryptography and the digital signatures,
and since the standard does not dictate a speciﬁc algorithm,
RSA (asymmetric cryptography) is recommended [13]. The
scheme is complete with the existence of a Certiﬁcate
Authority (CA). CA issues certiﬁcates and binds each entity
with a private-public key pair [14]. It is imperative that both
parties entrust the CA. In 802.16 authentication, the issuer is
the manufacturer or another trusted entity.
The X.509 v.3 for the 802.16 standard contains the
following information:
(i) version of the X.509 certiﬁcate,
(ii) the unique Certiﬁcate serial number which the CA
issues,
(iii) certiﬁcate signature. Public Key Cryptography Stan-
dard (PKCS) #1 with RSA cipher and SHA-1 hashing
algorithm,
(iv) certiﬁcate (CA) issuer,
(v) certiﬁcate validity period,
(vi) certiﬁcate subject, which indentiﬁes the entity whose
public key is certiﬁed,
(vii) subject’s public key, which provides the certiﬁcate
holder’s public key, identiﬁes how the public key is
used, and it is restricted to RSA encryption. The key
size is at least 1024 bit and 2048 bit maximum,
(viii) the certiﬁcate issuer unique ID; Optional ﬁeld to
allow reuse of issuer name over time,
(ix) the certiﬁcate subject unique ID; Optional ﬁeld to
allow reuse of subject name over time,
(x) certiﬁcate extensions,
(xi) signature algorithm (PKCS#1),
(xii) signature value which is the digital signature of the
Abstract Syntax Notation 1 Distinguished Encoding
Rules (ASN.1 DER) encoding of the rest of the
certiﬁcate.
The ﬁrst message that SS sends is informative and it provides
a mechanism for the BS to obtain information for the
certiﬁcate of the SS. However, the BS may choose to ignore
it. In the second message (Authorization Request) that is
sent right after the ﬁrst one, the SS requests authorization.
The message includes (i) the X.509 certiﬁcate, (ii) the list
of the cryptographic suite identiﬁers, each implementing a
pairofpacketdataencryptionandauthenticationalgorithms
that SS supports, (iii) the SS’s Basic CID, which is the ﬁrst
static CID that BS assigns to SS during initial ranging. As
mentioned earlier, the primary SAID is equal to the Basic
CID.
When the BS receives the message, it authorizes the SS
via the X.509 certiﬁcate, it checks for basic unicast services
and other possible additional services the SS has subscribed
for, and ﬁnally, it determines the cryptographic suite from
the SS’s list of the second message. Then, with a random
or pseudo-random function, the BS generates the AK and
encrypts it with the SS’s public key. The encrypted AK is sent
from the BS in an Authorization Reply message along with:
(i) A 4-bit key sequence number that distinguishes
successive generations of AKs.
(ii) The SAIDs of the single primary and static SAs the
SS is authorized to obtain key material for. The
authorization reply does not identify any Dynamic
SAs.
When the SS receives the message, it decrypts the AK with
its private key, reads the deﬁned cipher suite and the SAIDs,
and then proceeds to key exchange with the BS. The AK
remains active until it expires according to the predeﬁned
lifetime set by the BS. The SS periodically refreshes the AK
by issuing authorization requests. The BS is able to support
two active AKs simultaneously for each SS. Those keys must
have overlapping times. Additionally, BS is always ready to
send an AK to a SS upon request. The AK transition period
begins when the BS receives an authorization message from
a SS and the BS has a single active AK for that SS. Right after
the BS receives the message, it activates the second AK which
has a sequence number increased by one from the older AK,
and it sends it to the SS. The lifetime of the second AK is
the remaining lifetime of the older AK, plus the predeﬁned
AK lifetime. The lifetime ranges from one day to 70 days,
with a default value of 7 days. If the SS does not reauthorize
itself before the expiration of the current AK key, the BS
does not create the sequentially next AK and considers the
SS unauthorized.
3.1.2. Key Derivation and Management. With the AK deliv-
ered to SS, a key derivation will proceed to create the
necessary traﬃc key material to implement the security
mechanisms. From AK three keys will be derived.
(i) The Key Encryption Key (KEK). KEK is responsible
for the encryption of the Temporal Encryption Key
(TEK), that BS sends to each SS. TEKs are used for
the MPDU encryption to ensure conﬁdentiality.
(ii) The Downlink Hash function-based Message Au-
thentication Code (HMAC KEY D). For the BS, the
HMAC KEY D is used to calculate the HMAC digest
for some of the management messages that it sends
to SS, while for the SS it is used to verify the HMAC-
Digest from the aforementioned received messages.
(iii) The Uplink Hash function-based Authentication
Code (HMAC KEY U). For the SS, the HMAC
KEY U is used to calculate the HMAC-Digest for
some management messages that it sends to the BS,
while the BS uses it to verify the HMAC-Digest of the
management messages sent from the SS.Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 9
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The BS is responsible to keep the keying information for
every SS that joins the network. After key derivation the SS
starts a separate TEK state machine for each of the SAIDs
(thesingleprimaryandanystaticSAthattheBShasassigned
to SS). The TEK state machine (see Figure 8) consists of
six stages (Start, Operational Wait, Operational Reauthorize
W a i t ,O p e r a t i o n a l ,R e k e yW a i t ,R e k e y ,R e a u t h o r i z eW a i t ) ,
and nine events (Stop, Authorized, Authorization Pend-
ing, Authorization Complete, TEK Invalid, Timeout, TEK
RefreshTimeout,KeyReply,KeyReject).Itstaskistomanage
key material associated with the respective SAID. Each
TEK state machine operates with a key request scheduling
algorithm to refresh key material for their respective SAID.
T h eB Sa l w a y sk e e p st w os e t so fa c t i v eT E K sa l o n gw i t h
their respective 64-bit IV for each SAID. For TEK and
IV generation, the BS uses a random or a pseudorandom
function. The lifetime for each TEK is between 30 minutes to
7 days, with the default value set to 12 hours. The two TEKs10 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
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have overlapping lifetimes, just like the AK keys, and the
sequence number of the newer is the older number plus one.
Each new TEK becomes active halfway through the lifetime
of its successor. For each SAID, the BS uses the older of the
two active TEKs for encryption of the downlink traﬃc, while
for the uplink traﬃc uses the older or the newer.
The PKM protocol for the TEK refresh procedure uses
the SA-TEK 3-way handshake (see Figure 9)[ 12].
(i) Message 1. This message is optional, and BS uses it only
w h e ni tw a n t st of o r c ear e - k e yo fa nS A ,o rc r e a t ean e wo n e .
In this message the BS sends the key sequence number, its
SAID and the digest of this message with the HMAC KEY D.
(ii) Message 2. If BS does not force re-keying, message 2 is
the ﬁrst message that the SS sends to re-key each SA. In this
message, the SS sends to BS the key sequence number, its
SAID, and the digest of the message with the HMAC KEY U.
(iii) Message 3. The BS receives the second message, veriﬁes
the digest with HMAC KEY U and if is successful, it sends
backthekeysequencenumber,theSAID,theoldandthenew
TEK with their parameters, along with the message digest.
The BS encrypts the old and the new TEK with KEK and
sends it to SS.
For the Mesh Mode, each node after authorization starts
for each of its neighbors a separate TEK state machineJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 11
for each of the SAIDs identiﬁed during the authentication
procedure. The node has the task to maintain the two active
TEKs for each SAID between itself and all the other nodes
that it initiated the TEK exchange with. The TEK state
machine is responsible to maintain keying material. The
neighborrepliestotheKeyRequestmessagewithaKeyReply
message. The message contains the BS’s active TEK for a
speciﬁc SAID and it is encrypted with the node’s public key.
3.1.3. Conﬁdentiality. Conﬁdentiality includes data and TEK
Encryption.
Data Encryption. In data encryption the encrypted frames
are the MPDU payload along with the 64-bit ICV of the
payload (see Figure 10). The ICV is added right after the
PDU.Atthefront,a32-bitPacketNumber(PN)isappended.
Forthesakeofuniqueness,thereareseparaterangesofvalues
for the uplink and the downlink [15]. According to the TEK
length, two encryption methods are implemented.
(i) DES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, when
TEK is 64 bit. DES in CBC mode uses a 56-bit key
with a 64-bit block encryption along with the 64-
bit IV. The function actually expects the 64-bit TEK
key, but only the56 bits are used [13]. With the
DES-CBC mode, each encrypted ciphertext block is
XORed with the next plaintext block to be encrypted,
and therefore, it makes the blocks dependent on all
the previous blocks. Consequently, in order to ﬁnd
the plaintext of a particular block, the ciphertext, the
key, and the ciphertext of the previous block must
be known. The ﬁrst encrypted block has no previous
ciphertext, and so the plaintext is XORed with the IV.
This mode of operation improves security from the
regular DES.
(ii) AES in CCM mode when TEK is 128-bit. The AES in
CCM mode uses a 128-bit key and 128-bit block size.
The key-PN combination will not be used more than
once. The reason is that two sent packets encoded
with the same key-PN combination eliminate the
security guarantees of the CCM mode. For this
reason, and only in the AES-CCM mode, when more
than half of the available numbers of the 32-bit PN
have been exhausted, the SS schedules a new Key
Request, to obtain new key material and avoid this
incident.
TEK Encryption. The TEK encryption is again dependent on
its key-size. If the size of the TEK is 64-bit, the 112-bit 3-
DES is used. The keying material of 3-DES consists of two
distinct DES keys. The 64 most signiﬁcant bits of the KEK
are used in the encryption. If the TEK size is 128-bit, the
128-bit AES in ECB mode will be used with a 128-bit KEK.
Another encryption method for the 128-bit TEK is the RSA
encryption with the SS’s public key.
3.1.4. Integrity. For data traﬃc integrity, ICV is calculated
from two modes:
(i) CBCmode.ThedownlinkCBCIVisinitializedasthe
XOR of the IV included in the TEK’s SAID, and the
content of the PHY synchronization ﬁeld of the latest
DL MAP.TheuplinkCBCIVisinitializedastheXOR
oftheIVincludedintheTEK’sSAID,andthecontent
ofthePHYsynchronizationﬁeldoftheDL MAPthat
is in eﬀect when the UL MAP is created.
(ii) CCM mode. The CCM provides data integrity and
data origin authentication for some data outside the
payload. The ICV is computed from the ESP header,
the Payload, and the ESP trailer ﬁelds, which is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the CCM-imposed limit.
The ESP payload is composed from the IV, the
encryptedpayloadandtheAuthenticationdataasitis
deﬁned in the RFC 4309 (“Using Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard CCM Mode with IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload”).
For the management messages integrity, two 160-bit keys
(HMAC KEY D, HMAC KEY U) are used to create the
HMAC digest for integrity protection and authentication,
by implementing the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1).
The digest is calculated over the entire MAC management
message, except from the HMAC digests and the HMAC
tupple attributes. The HMAC Sequence number in the
HMAC tupple is the AK sequence number from which the
HMAC KEY has been derived.
3.2. Security Mechanisms in 802.16e. Although IEEE 802.16-
2004 has a strong security protocol, the introduction of the
802.16e corrigendum with its mobility services has enhanced
and corrected weaknesses appearing in the 802.16 standard.
Due to mobility features introduced with 802.16e, the SS
b e c o m e saM o b i l eS t a t i o n( M S )a sw e l l .
3.2.1. Authentication. With the 802.16e standard, the PKM
protocol besides the unilateral authentication of the SS,
it can implement mutual authentication for BS and SS.
Two methods are used for authentication (see Figure 11):
The known X.509 digital certiﬁcate with RSA public key
encryptionasdescribedinthe802.16authentication,andthe
EAP method. EAP is a generic authentication protocol and
therebyithastouseaparticularcredentialforauthentication
selected by the operator. Two are the credential types:
The X.509 digital certiﬁcate of EAP-TLS, and a Subscriber
IdentityModuleforEAP-SIM.TheEAPmethodsarenotpart
oftheprotocol,buttheymustfulﬁllsomemandatorycriteria
(Generation of Symmetric Keying Material, Key strength,
Mutual Authentication Support, Share State Equivalence,
Resistance to Dictionary attacks, Protection of Man in the
Middle attacks) as deﬁned in RFC 4017.
The new feature in 802.16e is the implementation of
two Privacy Key Management protocols PKM v.1, and PKM
v.2. The diﬀerence between the two versions is that PKM
v.2 implements more enhanced security features than PKM
v.1 does. For both versions, the Authorization Finite State
Machine (FSM) remains as described in 802.16 standard.
3.2.2. PKM v.1 Authentication. Authentication with PKM v.1
is the same as described in the 802.16 standard, and it is12 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
unilateral (only SS is authenticated). The procedure uses
X.509 v.3 digital certiﬁcates with RSA public key encryption
for authorization and the following SAID allocation for the
single primary, and any static SAs the SS is subscribed for,
along with the AK derivation. For the SS’s X.509 certiﬁcate,
the Certiﬁcate Issuer Unique ID and the Certiﬁcate Subject
Unique ID ﬁelds are omitted. The EAP in PKM v.1 is
optionalandapplicableonlyifspeciﬁcallyrequired.Asnoted
in “Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
Key Management Requirements (RFC4017)”: EAP selects
one end-to-end authentication mechanism. The mechanisms
deﬁned in [RFC3748] only support unilateral authentica-
tion, and they do not support mutual authentication or
key derivation. As a result, these mechanisms do not fulﬁl
the security requirements for many deployment scenarios,
including Wireless LAN authentication [RFC4017]. To ensure
adequate security and interoperability, EAP applications need
to specify mandatory-to-implement algorithms. IEEE 802.16e
does not specify a mandatory-to-implement EAP method,
nor does it specify the required security properties of EAP
methods areto be used. The speciﬁcationas it stands permits
implementationstousetheEAPMD5-Challenge,whichdoes
notgeneratekeysandisvulnerabletodictionaryattacks[16].
3.2.3. PKM v.2 Authentication. In PKMv2, RSA and EAP can
be used in diﬀerent deployments such as RSA, RSA-EAP,
EAP and EAP-EAP. With two authentication schemes, there
are two sources possible for keying material derivation. The
RSA based authentication initially creates the pre-Primary
AK (pre-PAK), and the EAP creates the Master Session Key
(MSK), both for key derivation and management.
The enhancement in the protocol is the mutual authen-
tication between BS and SS. With mutual authentication, the
BS presents its own certiﬁcate to each SS joins the network.
This certiﬁcate presents the following.
(i) Country Name (Country of operation)
(ii) Organization Name (Name of infrastructure opera-
tor)
(iii) Organizational Unit Name (Wireless MAN)
(iv) Common Name (Serial number)
( v )C o m m o nN a m e( T h eo p e r a t o rd e ﬁ n e dB SI D ) .
Like in PKM v.1, the Certiﬁcate Issuer Unique ID and the
Certiﬁcate Subject Unique ID of the SS’s X.509 certiﬁcate
ﬁelds are omitted.
Mutual authentication is performed in two schemes.
In the ﬁrst only the mutual authentication is used, while
in the second, mutual authentication is followed by EAP
authentication. In the latter case, the mutual authentication
is implemented only for initial network entry, while EAP is
implemented in the re-entry authentication.
The authorization process (see Figure 12) begins again
like in 802.16 with the Authentication Information message
from SS to BS. Right after, the SS sends the Authorization
Request message consisted of: (i) the SS’s X.509 certiﬁcate,
(ii) the list of the cryptographic suite identiﬁers, each imple-
menting a pair of packet data encryption and authentication
EAP method
EAP
EAP encapsulation /
decapsulation
Authorization /
SA control
RSA based
authentication
PKM control management
Traﬃc data encryption /
authentication processing
Control message processing
Message authentication
processing
PHY SAP
Scope of IEEE 802.16 speciﬁcations
Scope of recommendations (out of scope)
Figure 11: 802.16e security sublayer.
algorithms that SS supports, (iii) the SS’s Basic CID, which is
the ﬁrst static CID that the BS assigns to the SS during initial
ranging, (iv) A 64-bit random number generated in the SS
(SSNonce).
Again, when the BS receives the message, it validates the
SS’s identity with the X.509 certiﬁcate, it checks for basic
unicast services and possibly additional statically services
the SS is subscribed for, and ﬁnally, it determines the
cryptographic suite from SS’s list from the second message.
Then, the BS generates the pre-PAK and encrypts it with the
SS’s public key. The encrypted pre-PAK is sent from BS in an
Authorization Reply message along with the following.
(i) The BS’s certiﬁcate.
(ii) A 4-bit key PAK sequence number that distinguishes
successive generations of AKs.
(iii) The lifetime of PAK
(iv) The SAIDs of the single primary and static SAs the SS
is authorized to obtain key material for.
(v) The 64-bit SSNonce.
(vi) A64-bitrandomnumber(BSNonce)generatedinthe
BS to ensure along with SS’s nonce the liveness of the
message for replay attacks prevention.
(vii) AnRSAsignatureforeveryattributeintheauthoriza-
tion reply message to ensure message integrity.
When the SS receives the message; it decrypts the pre-
PAK with its private key, reads the deﬁned cipher suite and
the SAIDs, and proceeds to key exchange with BS.
3.2.4. PKM v.2 Key Derivation and Management. In 802.16
with PKM, the AK derived from BS right after the Autho-
rization Request from SS; the same is implemented with
PKM v.1. In PKM v.2 the diﬀerent authentication schemes
(RSA,RSA-EAP,EAP,EAP-EAP)usediﬀerentkeymaterialtoJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 13
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Figure 13: AK derivation with RSA authentication.
construct the 160-bit AK. All the key derivations though, are
based on the Dot16KF algorithm, a CTR mode construction
that can be used for the creation of an arbitrary amount
of keying material from source keying material. If RSA
authentication is used, the initial key material is the 256-
bit pre-PAK sent from BS to SS. If EAP is used, the key
transferred to 802.16e layer is the 512-bit Master Session Key
(MSK),whichisknowntotheAAAserver,theAuthenticator,
and the SS. For every authentication scheme, the AK will
derive with the following way.
(i) RSA Authentication Only. From pre-PAK, the SS’s MAC
address and the BSID, two 160-bit keys are generated. The
PAKand theEAP Integrity Key(EIK).With thetwonew keys
along with SS’s MAC address and the BSID, the AK is derived
(see Figure 13).
(ii) EAP Authentication Only. From MSK, the 160-bit Pair-
wise Master Key (PMK) is derived, and optionally the EIK
with a MSK truncation to 320bits. From PKM, the SS’s
MAC address and the BSID, the AK is derived. During
authentication the BS will provide to SS the respective 4-bit
PMK sequence number, as it happens with PAK and RSA.
The SS caches the PMK upon successful authentication, as
theAuthenticatordoesuponitsreceiptviatheAAAprotocol.
When a new PMK is cached for an SS, the authenticator
deletes the old PMK which was used for the speciﬁc SS (see
Figure 14).
(i) RSA-EAP Authentication. With the RSA encryption as it
was described before, the PAK and the EIK are derived. From
EAP in a similar way as before, the PMK is generated. From
PAK XORed with PMK, the SS’s MAC address and the BSID,
the AK is ﬁnally created (see Figure 15).
(ii)EAP-EAPAuthentication. FromtheﬁrstEAPauthentica-
tion, two keys are generated; the PMK-1 and the EIK. From14 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
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Figure 14: AK derivation with EAP authentication.
the second EAP authentication, only the second PMK-2 is
created. With PMK-1 XORed with PMK-2, the SS’s MAC
address and the BSID the AK is derived (see Figure 16).
Like in 802.16, the SS periodically refresh its AK by
reissuing Authorization Requests to the BS, and both SS and
BS hold simultaneously two active AK’s with overlapping
times. The only enhancement in PKM v.2 for the AK is the
introduction of a 64-bit ID for each AK (AKID). The AKID
is created from AK, AK sequence number, the SS’s MAC
address and the BSID.
After the AK generation as described in 802.16, three
keys are created. One of the three keys is the 128-bit KEK
for TEK encryption during the SA-TEK 3-way handshake.
The other two keys, the downlink message authentication
key and the uplink authentication key will derive according
to the used MAC mode. With PKM v.2 two MACs can
be implemented. The known from 802.16 HMAC and the
new Cipher based MAC (CMAC). In the latter case, the
calculated hash value is derived from the CMAC algorithm
with AES. The value is calculated over a ﬁeld that contains:
(i) the 64-bit AKID, (ii) the 32-bit CMAC packet number
counter, (iii) the 16-bit connection ID, (iv) a 16-bit zero
padding for the header alignment with the AES block
size, and (v) the entire MAC management message. With
CMAC the downlink authentication key CMAC KEY Di s
used to authenticate management messages in the downlink
direction, while the respective CMAC KEY U is used to
authenticate management messages in the uplink direction.
Therefore, from AK and the implemented MAC, two options
are available.
(i) AK with HMAC: In this case the derived keys are:
the 128-bit KEK, the 160-bit HMAC KEY U and the
160-bit HMAC KEY D,
(ii) AK with CMAC: In this case the derived keys are
the 128-bit KEK, the 128-bit CMAC KEY U. and the
128-bit CMAC KEY D.
It must be stressed that if only EAP authentication is
used, the EIK will be used instead of the AK to generate the
aforementioned keys.
The TEK state machine remains the same as described in
802.16 managing key material associated with the respective
SAID, but due to the supported multicast features TEK
consists of an additional state (Multicast and Broadcast
Rekey Interim Wait), and two more events (Group- KEK
UpdatedandGTEKUpdated) totherestdescribed in802.16.
The diﬀerence is that the PKM v.2 implements an enhanced
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Figure 15: AK derivation with RSA-EAP authentication.
SA-TEK 3-way handshake, which operates in the following
way (see Figure 17).
(i) Message 1. During the initial network entry or a reautho-
rization, the BS sends a SA-TEK challenge, which includes a
random number (BS-Nonce), to the SS with HMAC/CMAC
protection. If the BS does not receive a SA-TEK Request
message within a certain period of time, it resends the SA-
TEK challenge. If again for a certain number of times the
BS does not receive a SA-TEK Request, it starts another full
authentication procedure or it drops the SS.
(ii) Message 2. The SS sends the SA-TEK request along with
the random number from the SA-TEK challenge, protected
with the HMAC/CMAC. In case where the SS does not
receive a SA-TEK Response from the BS, it transmits the
messageagainforaspeciﬁcnumberoftimes.Ifagainreceives
no Response, it fully initiates the authentication procedure.
(iii) Message 3. When the BS receives the SA-TEK Request
from the SS, it performs a number of checks before sending
the SA-TEK Response message: (i) conﬁrms that the AKID
corresponds to the current AK. If it does not correspond, the
BS ignores the message; (ii) veriﬁes the HMAC/CMAC. If it
is invalid, the BS ignores the message; (iii) veriﬁes that the
BSNoncereceivedfromSSwiththeSA-TEKRequestmatches
with the sent random number in the ﬁrst message. This
processaddsfreshnesstothemessagesandthereforeprevents
replay attacks. If the number is diﬀerent, the BS ignores
the message; (iv) checks the SS’s security parameters, and if
they do not match it reports it to the higher layers. If the
validation is successful the BS sends the SA-TEK Response
message protected with HMAC/CMAC. For unicast SAs, the
BS for each SAID sends the TEK, the TEK’s lifetime, the
TEK’s sequence number, and the 64-bit CBC IV, encryptedJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 15
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Figure 16: AK derivation with EAP-EAP authentication.
with KEK. In case of group or multicast SAs, the BS for
a speciﬁc GSAID sends the GTEK, the GKEK, the GTEK
remaining lifetime, the GTEK’s sequence number and the
CBC IV, encrypted with KEK.
When the SS receives the SA-TEK Response message it
veriﬁes the HMAC/CMAC digest. If it is valid the SS installs
the TEK and its parameters, otherwise, the SS ignores the
message.
3.2.5. Multicasting Key Derivation. In multicasting, the key
derivation starts with the random generation of the 128-
bit Group KEK (GKEK) from the BS and the 64-bit GKEK
ID. The key encrypted with KEK is transmitted to SS.
There is one GKEK per Group Security Association (GSA)
and it is used to encrypt the Group TEK (GTEK) sent in
multicastmessagestotheSSsjointhegroup.GTEKisusedto
encrypt multicast data packets and it is randomly generated
from the BS. GKEK generates the CMAC KEY GD for the
authentication of multicast messages. The GSA contains
keying material and it is used to secure multicast groups. It is
deﬁnedseparatelyfromSAsbecausetheyoﬀerlowersecurity,
since each of the members joining the group share the keying
material and consecutively can forge traﬃca si fi tc a m ef r o m
any other member of the group.
3.2.6. Conﬁdentiality with PKM v.2. The length of the TEK
an the KEK keys must be either 64 or 128bits. If the SA
implements a cipher suite with a block size of 128bits, the
TEK and the KEK are 128-bit long. Otherwise the length is
64bits.
Data Encryption. In data encryption, the encrypted frames
aretheMPDUpayloadalongwiththe64-bitCiphertextMes-
sage Authentication Code (see Figure 18). The Ciphertext
MAC is added right after the PDU, while at the front, the 32-
bitPacketNumber(PN)isappended.Again,forthePNthere
areseparaterangesofvaluesfortheuplinkandthedownlink.
According to the TEK length, three encryption methods are
implemented.
(i) DES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode using a
56-bit key with 64-bit block encryption along with
the 64-bit IV,
(ii) AES in CCM mode with 128-bit key and 128-bit
block size,
(iii) AES in CBC mode with 128-bit TEK key and 128-bit
block size.
TEK Encryption. The KEK is used for the encryption of the
TEK. If it is to encrypt a 128-bit TEK, the 128-bit of the KEK
are used directly, otherwise, if TEK is 64-bit long the KEK
splits in two 64-bit DES keys. The TEK encryption methods
are
(i) 3-DES for 64-bit TEK encryption
(ii) AES in ECB mode for 128-bit TEK encryption
(iii) RSA with SS’s public key for 128-bit TEK encryption
(iv) AES Key Wrap for 128-bit TEK encryption. The AES
Key Wrap is designed to encrypt key data, and the
algorithm accepts both the ciphertext and the ICV, as
it is deﬁned in the RFC 3394 (“Advanced Encryption
Standard Key Wrap Algorithm”).
Group KEK Encryption. The GKEK is encrypted with KEK
and the encryption methods are the aforementioned meth-
ods used for the TEK.
3.2.7. Integrity with PKM v.2. For the MPDU payload
integrity, the ICV can be derived from three modes.
(i) DES-CBC mode. The downlink CBC IV now is
initialized as the XOR of the IV included in the TEK’s
SAID, and the content of the PHY synchronization
ﬁeld of the current frame number. The uplink CBC
IV is initialized as the XOR of the IV included
in the TEK’s SAID, and the content of the PHY
synchronization ﬁeld of the Frame Number of the
frame where the relevant UL MAP was transmitted.
(ii) AES-CCM mode. The integrity procedure of the
AES-CCM is the same as it was described for the
801.16 and the PKM protocol.
(iii) AES-CBC mode. The CBC IV created with the XOR
of: (i) the CBC IV parameter included in the TEK
keying information, (ii) the 128-bit concatenation of
the 48-bit MPDU header, (iii) the PHY synchroniza-
tion value of the MPA that the data transmission
occurs, (iv) the 48-bit MAC address and the Zero hit
counter.
For management message integrity protection and authenti-
cation two MAC modes are implemented.
(i) The HMAC digest with the Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1). In PKM v.2 the short-HMAC calculation
includetheHMACpacketnumberconcatenatedafter
the MAC management message. The HMAC packet
number is the AK sequence number.16 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
Subscriber station (SS)
The SS checks the message
digest and decrypts the TEK
with KEK
SA TEK challenge
SAID
BS nonce
Message digest with HMA C/CMAC
SA TEK request
BS nonce
Message digest with HMA C/CMAC
SA TEK response
New 4-bit TEK’S sequence number
64-bit CBC IV
New TEK encrypted with KEK
Message digest with HMA C/CMAC
Base station (BS)
During the initial network entry or
a reauthorization, the BS sends a
SA-TEK challenge to create a new
TEK. If the SS does not respond
to some SA-TEK challenge
messages for TEK creation, the
BS rejects or re-starts
the authentication procedure
BS checks if the AKID is valid
Checks the HMAC/CMAC digest
Checks if the BS-nonce is the same
with the one the BS sent along with
the ﬁrst message(SA-TEK challenge)
Figure 17: SA-TEK 3-way handshake with PKM v.2.
Payload - Lbytes
Encryption procedure
MAC
header
PN
4bytes Payload
MAC
8bytes CRC
L+12b yt es
Encrypted frames
Figure 18: MAC 802.16e encryption frames.
(ii) The CMAC value is implemented as it was described
earlier in the PKM v.2 Key derivation and manage-
ment entity.
4.WiFi-WiMAXSecurityComparison
In this section we present a summary of the security mech-
anisms for authentication, key derivation and management,
conﬁdentiality, and integrity procedures applied in WiFi and
WiMAX networks.
From the security description in sections WiFi and
WiMAX, and with the aid of the following Table 1,i ti se a s y
to conclude that WiMAX security is much stronger than it
is in WiFi. One of the reasons of course is the large areas
that WiMAX covers, and therefore, such conditions demand
secure operational conditions of the network, which requires
strong security mechanisms.
On the other hand WiFi undoubtedly covers small areas
comparing to WiMAX but many WiFi network deployments
in companies, industries, agencies and in many cases
domestic users, handle valuable conﬁdential information
that cannot be compromised. In this case, WiFi security is
demanded to be as strong in performance as it happens with
theWiMAXmechanisms.Havingsaidthat,itisapparentthat
WEP and WPA security, with RC4 encryption and shared-
key authentication, is not adequate to provide guaranteed
conﬁdentiality, integrity and secure user-authentication.Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 17
Table 1: WiFi and WiMAX security comparison.
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IEEE Protocol WiFi
WEP WPA WPA2
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Method
Open System
Authentication 802.1X authentication 802.11X authentication with (RADIUS)
server. The EAP method used by IEEE
802.1X will support mutual
authentication, as the STA needs
assurance that the AP is legitimate.
Shared Key
Authentication
Shared Key Authentication
K
e
y
D
e
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a
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a
n
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M
a
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a
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Key Management
and short description
The keys from traﬃc
encryption are consisted
of the concatenation of
the 40bit shared key and
the 24bit IV for a 64bit
key. Most of the vendors
use a 104bit shared key
concatenated with the
24bit IV to create a
124bit key
TKIP. The 48-bit IV ﬁeld is
used as MPDU TKIP
Sequence Counter (TSC).
TKIP uses key mixing
consisted of the Temporal Key
(TK), the Transmit Address
(TA), and the TSC for the
WEP seed. The WEP seed
produced from
the aforementioned
parameters operates just like
the WEP IV. Therefore,
assures that every data packet
is sent with its own unique
encryption key
Pairwise key hierarchy for unicast traﬃc
protection. The ﬁrst key is the 256bit
PMK. PMK derivation depends on the
authentication method. If 802.1X is used,
the PMK derives from server and the ﬁrst
256bits AAA key. If pre-shared key is
used, the password is used to create the
PMK. PMK generates the PTK from
PMK. From PTK three keys are derived.
(I) The 128bit EAPOL KCK, for data
origin authenticity in the authentication
procedure. (II) The 128bit EAPOL KEK.
(III) The 256bit for TKIP or 128bit for
AES-CCMP Temporal Key (TK) for
WPA2 traﬃc conﬁdentiality. Group key
hierarchy for multicast and broadcast
traﬃc protection. The ﬁrst key created is
the GMK. The key GTK. Its length is
256bit with TKIP, and 128bit for CCMP.
The TK derived from GTK is 256bit with
TKIP, and 128bit for CCMP and it is
used for conﬁdentiality
C
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
i
t
y TraﬃcK e yE n c r y p t i o n
Algorithm None None
TK encryption: (I) RC4 with 128-bit
KEK. (II) With AES Key Wrap with
128bit KEK.
Cipher Algorithms for
traﬃc Data and Key size
RC4 with 64bit key
(WEP-40) RC4 with 256-bit key. AES-CCM with 128bit TK
RC4 with 128bit key
(WEP-104)
Encrypted Frames MPDU + ICV MPDU + MIC + ICV MPDU + MIC
I
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y
Integrity Algorithm 32bit ICV with CRC-32
(i) 64bit Michael MIC. ( i )6 4b i tC C MM I Cf o rt r a ﬃc messages
(ii) 32bit ICV (ii-a) HMAC-MD5 with KCK,
(ii-b) HMAC-SHA1 with 128bit KCK for
EAPOL 4-way handshake.
Protected Frames MPDU
[Michael MIC]: MSDU
Sender and Destination
Address (SA, DA), the MSDU
Priority, and the MSDU
payload
[MIC]: MPDU+ Additional
Authentication Data (AAD). The AAD is
comprised of the MPDU header, subﬁelds
from MAC frame control, addresses from
source and destination ﬁelds, Sequence
Control (SC), QoS control ﬁeld.
[ICV]: MPDU
[HMAC]: EAPOL 4-way handshake
messages18 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
(b)
IEEE Protocol WiMAX
802.16 802.16e
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Method
Privacy Key Management Protocol (PKM). Only
SS authentication with X.509 version 3 and RSA
public-key cryptography
2 PKM versions. V.1 is the 802.16 PKM, and V.2 is
more enhanced with mutual authentication option
(BS presents its certiﬁcate to SS). Two authentication
schemes can be used separately or combined: RSA,
EAP, RSA-EAP, EAP after EAP authentication. For
RSA, client authentication with X.509 v.3 certiﬁcates.
EAP uses credentials: X509 certiﬁcate for EAP-TLS,
or Subscriber Identity Module for EAP-SIM.
K
e
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Key Management
and short description
After Certiﬁcate approval, BS sends authorization
reply with Authorization Key (AK) encrypted
with client’s Public Key, and the Security
Association set Identity (SAID). From AK derives
KEK, HMAC KEY U, HMAC KEY D, (U for
uplink and D for downlink). The last two keys
used for the HMAC digest for management
messages. For every SAID, a TEK state machine is
responsible for key material usage. TEK sends
periodically messages for key content refresh.
TEK key material is used for uplink and downlink
encryption. BS maintains 2 sets of active AKs and
TEKs, old and new for each SAID. There is a 4-bit
AK sequence number increased by one for each
new AK. Additionally a 32-bit packet number
(PN). Both prevent replay attacks
AK in PKM v.2 operates as in PKM. In PKM v.2,
there two key material primary sources. For RSA, BS’
initial key material is the 256-bit pre-PAK (primary
authorization key). Pre-PAK gives 160bit PAK and
160bit EIK (EAP Integrity Key). PAK+EIK+SS MAC
a d d r e s s+B S I Dg e n e r a t eA K .F o rE A Po n l y ,t h e
initial key is the 512-bit Master Session Key (MSK)
and generates the 160bit Pairwise Master Key
(PMK) and optionally the 160bit EIK with MSK
truncation to 320 bits. From PMK+SS’ MAC address
+ BSID AK derives. For RSA-EAP, PAK and EIK
d e r i v ef r o mR S Aa n dP M Kf r o mE A P .A Ki s
generated from PAK XOR PMK+ SS’ MAC address +
BSID. For EAP after EAP, PMK1 and EIK derive and
from 2nd EAP PMK2 derives. PMK1 XOR
PMK2+SS’ MAC address and BSID, the AK derives.
From AK 3 keys derive: One is the 128-bit KEK and
the other two are: (I) The 160bit HMAC KEY U
and HMAC KEY D, if HMAC is used, and (II) The
128bit CMAC KEY Ua n dC M A CKEY D, if CMAC
is used. If EAP only is used, the three
aforementioned keys will derive from EIK. All key
derivations are based on the Dot16KF algorithm
C
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
t
i
a
l
i
t
y TraﬃcK e yE n c r y p t i o n
Algorithm
(i)112bit 3-DES with 64bit KEK, if TEK is 64 bits. (i) 112bit 3-DES with 64bit KEK, if TEK is 64bits.
(ii) AES in ECB mode with 128bit KEK, if TEK is
128bits.
(ii) AES in ECB mode with 128bit KEK, if TEK is
128bits.
(iii) RSA encryption with SS’s public key if TEK is
128bits.
(iii) RSA with SS’s public key if TEK is 128bits.
(iv) AES Key Wrap with 128-bit KEK for 128-bit
TEK encryption.
Cipher Algorithms for
traﬃc Data and Key size
(i) DES- CBC with 56bit TEK and 64bit block
encryption along with 64bit IV.
(i) DES in CBC mode.
(ii) AES in CCM mode with 128bit TEK.
(ii) AES in CCM mode.
(iii) AES in CBC mode with 128bit TEK.
Encrypted Frames MPDU + ICV MPDU + MAC (Message Authentication Code)
I
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y Integrity Algorithm
(i) DES-CBC mode for 64bit ICV. (i) DES-CBC mode for 64bit MAC.
(ii) AES-CCM mode for 64bit ICV. (ii) AES-CCM mode for 64bit MAC.
(iii) SHA-1 for HMAC. (iii) AES-CBC mode for 64bit MAC.
(iv) SHA-1 for HMAC Digest.
(v) AES-CMAC value.
Protected Frames
[ICV]: MPDU + additional packet information. [MAC]: MPDU = additional packet information.
[HMAC]: Management messages. [HMAC]: Management messages.
[CMAC]: Management messages + additional
information.Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 19
On the other hand, the Robust Security Network
Association (RSNA) with the 802.11i and the WPA2 does
provide a secure wireless network operation, and it is the
only security mechanism in WiFi that operates with AES
encryption,CCMPintegritymechanisms,keyderivationand
management with EAPOL, and secured user-authentication
with the 802.1X protocol, that resembles with the strong
mechanisms that WiMAX uses.
5. Threat Model for WiFi and WiMAX Networks
Wireless networks face potentially more threats due to the
lack of physical infrastructure. Some of the consequences
of these attacks include the loss of proprietary information,
legal and recovery costs, and the loss of network service.
Network security attacks are typically divided into passive
and active attacks [17].
In passive attacks an unauthorized entity monitors the
traﬃc, but does not modify its content. Passive attacks are
divided in two categories.
(1) eavesdropping, where the adversary monitors the
transmissions between a station/SS and an AP/BS,
(2) traﬃc analysis where the adversary listens into the
transmission in order to obtain information from the
transmitted packet-ﬂow.
In active attacks, the adversary proceeds to actions in
order to achieve his malicious intentions, using sometimes
information obtained from earlier passive attacks. Active
attacks can be divided in four categories.
(1) Masquerading(Spooﬁng). This type ofattackis actu-
ally a man-in-the-middle attack, where an adversary
places himself between two parties and manipulates
the communication between them. There are two
typesofspooﬁng:AP/BS,andMACaddressspooﬁng.
In the ﬁrst, the adversary pretends to be a legitimate
AP/BS and tricks users to join the rogue AP/BS
network and therefore gains access to information,
possible valuable for malicious purposes. With MAC
address spooﬁng, where the MAC address is used to
authenticate a station/SS, an adversary can replicate
the address of a user.
(2) Replay attacks. With this attack an adversary
reuses valid transmitted packets that he has inter-
cepted, without modifying the message during re-
transmission.
(3) Message modiﬁcation attacks, where the adversary
tampers the content of legitimate messages.
(4) Denial-of-Service (DoS), where the adversary pre-
vents the normal network operation with various
ways in PHY and in MAC layer. In PHY layer the
attack methods are: (i) jamming, where a device
emits electromagnetic energy on the network’s fre-
quencies. The energy makes the frequencies unusable
by the network, causing a denial of service. (ii)
Scrambling, which is similar to jamming but it is
applied for short intervals of time and targeted to
speciﬁc frames or parts of frames, usually control
or management messages, in order to disturb the
normal network operation [15]. In MAC layer the
attack is implemented with the transmission of
messages, aiming to decrease the network eﬃciency.
5.1. WiFi Threat Analysis. The operation of WiFi for almost
a decade has revealed various serious security weaknesses
like cryptographic vulnerabilities, network exploitations and
denial of service attacks, which easily can compromise the
wireless network security.
5.1.1. Passive Attacks. The passive attacks in WiFi networks
can provide valuable information to adversaries. With
eavesdropping, it is possible to gain information about
the parties’ identity and the time they communicate. With
traﬃc analysis it is possible to analyze traﬃcp a t t e r n sa n d
determine the content of communication, as short bursts of
activity could mean instant messaging and steady streaming
could reveal video conferencing. Additionally monitoring
and traﬃc analysis is the ﬁrst step to proceed and break
cryptographic keys and thereby compromise the network
conﬁdentiality and the authentication procedures. Passive
attacks, due to the characteristics of the wireless network, are
applicable to all WiFi schemes, namely WEP/WPA/WPA2,
since all packet traﬃc can be sniﬀed and stored.
5.1.2. Active Attacks
Key Cracking. As mentioned earlier, traﬃc analysis is the
ﬁrst step to cryptographic keys cracking. Indeed, the IV
portion of the RC4 key is not encrypted, which allows
an eavesdropper by analyzing a relatively small amount of
network traﬃc to recover the key having the IV value known
with the advantage of the small 24-bit IV key space, and a
weakness in the way WEP implements the RC4 algorithm.
Thus, if two messages have the same IV, and the plaintext
of either message is known, it is relatively easy for an
adversary to determine the plaintext of the second message
[8]. Additionally, many messages contain common protocol
headers or other easily guessable contents, and therefore, it
is possible to identify the original plaintext contents with
minimal eﬀort. Even traﬃc with sequentially increasing
IV values is susceptible to attack. There are 16.777.216
million possible IV values; on a busy WLAN, the entire IV
space may be exhausted in a few hours. When the IV is
chosen randomly, which represents the best possible generic
IV selection algorithm, by the birthday paradox two IVs
already have a 50% chance of colliding after about 212frames
[18, 19]. As analyzed before, the use of stream ciphers
is dangerous and therefore WEP and WAP face a serious
threat. With the implementation of AES-CCM with 128-
bit key in WPA2, the traﬃc data conﬁdentiality is well
secured. Shared key authentication in WEP and WPA can
be breached quite easily. One way is a man in the middle
attack where an adversary eavesdrops, captures and views
the clear-text challenge value and the encrypted response.20 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
Then he can analyze with oﬀ-line brute-force or dictionary
attacks the clear-text and the encrypted challenge and thus
determine the WEP key stream. Moreover, authentication
attack can be achieved by injecting properly encrypted WEP
messages without the key [18]. Another problem with shared
key authentication is that all devices have to use the same
WEP key because WEP does not support key management
as WPA and WPA2 when they use 802.1X authentication
with EAPOL 4-way handshake. Therefore, if the key is
compromised, it needs immediately to be replaced from all
stations.
Masquerading: Spooﬁng. Another way to surpass authenti-
cation is the MAC address spooﬁng [10]. Even if the 48-
bit address is large enough to prevent brute force guessing,
methods for MAC address ﬁltering and the fact that the
address is broadcasted freely in the wireless network, makes
it easy for an adversary to obtain it by sniﬃng the victim’s
communication. With various programs available to change
the MAC address in a PC network adapter within minutes,
even if the value in the hardware is encoded and cannot be
changed, the ﬁrmware value can be altered [20]. Moreover,
due to the fact that the AP is not authenticated to the
station, an adversary can masquerade a legitimate AP and
spoof a station to join the malicious network. The 802.1X
supports mutual authentication and therefore the station
is secured that the AP is legitimate. On the other hand,
802.1X with EAP-TLS prevents an adversary from forging,
modifying, and replaying authentication packets, provided
mutual authentication is used. Nevertheless, during the 4-
way handshake a session hijacking is possible after the 3rd
message sent from AP for successful EAP. At this point,
the adversary sends a disassociation management frame to
the station-victim to get disassociated, while the 802.1X
state machine of the authenticator still remains in the
authenticated state. The consequence of this is the network
access gaining from the adversary using the MAC address
of the authenticated supplicant [21]. Besides that, 802.1X
authentication is a very strong authentication mechanism
and undoubtedly is preferred in WLANs.
Replay Attacks. WEP does not provide protection against
replay attacks because it does not include features such as an
incrementing counter, nonce, timestamps that could detect
replayed messages immediately. In WPA/WPA2 the 48-bit
unique number for each packet is suﬃcient to prevent replay
attacks.
Message Modiﬁcation. Except from the conﬁdentiality
breaching of the implemented algorithms, the integrity
algorithm, the CRC-32 can be tampered with bit ﬂipping
attacks, since an adversary knows which CRC-32-bit will
have to change when message bits are altered even if the
CRC-32 ICV is encrypted, because a property of stream
ciphers, such as WEP’s RC4, is that bit ﬂipping survives
the encryption process, as the same bits ﬂip whether or not
encryption is used [22]. Michael MIC on the other hand
prevents an adversary from inserting modiﬁed messages.
Even if the adversary intercepts a packet and forwards it
to the victim-station later with a valid encrypted MIC,
the station will check that the PN is out-of-order and the
packet will be discarded. With CCM the integrity of the
message is much more secured because besides the payload,
CCM authenticates Additional Authentication Data (AAD)
as MAC frame control, Sequence Control (SC), addresses
from source and destination ﬁelds, making thus the message
modiﬁcation impossible, even in the ﬁelds sent clear in
the air. Additionally message authentication in EAPOL
4-way handshake provides a secure way to key distribution.
Although 802.11i protects data frames, it does not oﬀer
integrity protection to control or management messages. An
attacker can exploit the fact that management frames are
not authenticated, and thereby, he can use such messages
to destabilize the normal network operation. A message
modiﬁcation threat concerning all WiFi schemes is the IP
redirection attack. In this attack the AP acts a router with
internet connectivity, which is usually the case, and the
a d v e r s a r ya l li th a st od oi st os n i ﬀ an encrypted packet oﬀ
the air [18], modify it by giving it a new IP destination, and
redirect it to an address belongs to him. Later on, the AP will
decrypt and send the packet to the new malicious destina-
tion, where the adversary can read the packet in the clear.
DoS Attacks. DoS attacks in WiFi can cause serious implica-
tions in the network eﬃciency. In the PHY layer, jamming
can aﬀect the network operation not only intentionally by an
adversary, but from other WLANs transmitting in the same
frequency, which is something possible since channels in the
ISM band are very few. In the MAC layer, the availability
can be suspended with ﬂooding attack, where the adversary
takes advantage of the CSMA/CA mechanism by constantly
transmitting many short-length packets in a fast rate. The
eﬀect of this eﬀort is that each station within the network
range assumes that the medium is busy and, therefore, each
station listens to the medium and waits patiently for its
turn to transmit for as long the adversary uses this attack.
The implementation of this attack can be achieved easily
[23] by placing a wireless network interface card into a
test mode where it continuously transmits a test pattern.
Another DoS threat is the De-authentication attack, where
the adversary, as a legitimate AP, uses the deauthentication
message to all stations ordering them to quit the network.
The attack is successful since the AP address has been found,
which is easy as it is transmitted in the clear, and the
adversary has only to listen to the medium and obtain it
[24]. With the address available, the adversary transmits the
de-authentication message as a legitimate AP. Consequently,
every station gets misled and stops communication with
the network, having again to repeat the authentication
procedure. Another threat is packet removal by an adversary
and thus prevention from reaching its destination. This
can be done if the adversary interferes in the reception
process by causing CRC errors so that the receiver drops
the packet. Additionally, if the adversary uses a bidirectional
antenna, he can delete the packet on the receiver’s side, and
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for himself if he wants so [10]. The aforementioned DoS
attacks can be implemented in every WiFi scheme.
5.2. WiMAX Threat Analysis. The security in IEEE 802.16-
2004 and 802.16e standards is one of the most important
issues in the protocol architecture. The implementation of
strong and eﬃcient mechanisms makes the WiMAX security
very eﬃcient. Nevertheless, in this short period of their
existence, various weaknesses have emerged. Some of the
possible threats are similar to the ones that WiFi faced; this
observation stresses on the importance of the WiFi threat
analysis and the prevention measures that can be taken for
WiMAX. Of course, threats in WiFi did not appear right
after the introduction of the standards; it took a long period
of eﬀorts and computing time from hackers, Government
Agencies,Universities,andResearchInstitutionstorevealthe
security vulnerabilities issues. This is very important because
WiMAX is new and not suﬃciently operated to reveal the
actual weaknesses it might face, making thus the threat
analysis evaluation based on WiFi attacks and estimated
vulnerabilities from the new mechanisms of the standard.
5.2.1. Passive Attacks. As mentioned earlier, passive attacks
are achievable in a wireless network during packet transmis-
sion. Eavesdropping and traﬃc analysis threats can be used
todeterminethebehaviorofanentityaboutthetransmitting
times. Moreover, due to the fact that management messages
are sent in the clear, they can provide valuable information
about the location of the SS at a certain period of time [15].
Additionally monitoring and traﬃc analysis is necessary to
proceedwithcryptographickeyscrackingtocompromisethe
conﬁdentiality and authentication mechanisms.
5.2.2. Active Attacks
Key Cracking. Cryptographic immunity in WiMAX is based
onthefactthattheAKremainssecretbetweentheBSandthe
SS. If this is not the case, security is breached. Therefore, the
AK generation mechanism and the AK generation material
are two important issues. The AK creation according to
the standard is assumed to be random with the usage of a
uniform probability distribution; if this is the case,it must be
explicitly deﬁned. Anotherimportant matteristhe key mate-
rial used for the AK generation. The standard deﬁnes the
BS responsible for the AK creation. The potential problem
is if the random number generator appears speciﬁc bias to
expose the AK. The same issue appears with TEK generation,
as the standard fails to specify that the TEK is created using
a uniform probability distribution and a cryptographic-
quality random number generator [12]. TEK’s lifetime is
important if the usage period is approaching its maximum
value (7days) and the DES-CBC cipher is implemented. In
1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation [13, 25]b r o k ea
DES encryption in less than three days period, using a DES
cracker-machine with a structure costing less than 250.000$.
Itisobviousthatafteradecadewherecomputationeﬃciency
isenormousandthehardwarecostsareconstantlydecreased,
the DES cipher should be considered weak. DES uses a
64-bit block size. One theorem [12] describes that a CBC
mode using a block cipher with an n-bit block cipher loses
its security after operating on 2n/2 blocks with the same
encryption key. Therefore, with n = 64, the maximum safely
protected 64-bit blocks are 232. With an average throughput
of 10Mbps the 232 blocks are produced within 7.6 hours
approximately and thereby if TEK’s lifetime is at the default
value, namely 12hours, the security can be compromised.
Furthermore, the CBC mode requires a random IV to ensure
security but the standard uses a predictable IV [12]. On
the other hand, AES with key size of 128bits, and the
consideration of the current and the projected technology,
makesbrute-forceattacksimpractical[13];thereby,theusage
of AES-CCM and additionally the AES-CBC for the 802.16e,
makes data traﬃc secured. Nevertheless, AES-CCM faces
a potential threat when the key-PN combination is used
more than once; the reason is that two packets encoded
with the same key-PN combination eliminate the security
guarantees of the CCM mode. To prevent this, the new key
request as described in the standard, demands renewal when
more than half of the available numbers of the 32-bit PN
have been exhausted. Finally, TEK encryption is well secured
with all encryption schemes. Considering though energy
consumption, the RSA encryption of TEK with SS’s public
key and the calculating cost, makes this scheme useful only
if for some reason the KEKs cannot be usable for a period of
time.
Masquerading:Spooﬁng. Incaseofunilateralandnotmutual
authentication, a rogue BS can masquerade a legitimate
BS and spoof a number of SSs by using the BS’s address,
stolen over the air by intercepting management messages.
Nevertheless, since the adversary has to transmit during the
legitimate transmission, the procedure is more diﬃcult due
to the time division model [15]. Moreover, the signal of the
rogue BS must be stronger from that of the legitimate BS. If
this is done, the adversary waits until a time slot is allocated
to the legitimate BS and commences the attack. As in WiFi,
the threat of MAC address spooﬁng is viable. As it is deﬁned
in the standard, each SS has a 48-bit MAC address burned
intotheﬁrmwareanditisusedasveriﬁcationelementduring
authentication procedure from the BS. Currently all 802.16
based network equipment is in the form of standalone units,
where MAC address modiﬁcations require changes at the
ﬁ r m w a r el e v e lw h i c hi sd i ﬃcult unless aid if provided from
the manufacturer [20]. Unfortunately this will change since
one of the WiMAX Forum members, Intel, announced that
it plans to sell IEEE 802.16 compliant chipsets inside laptops
[26]. If this is to be implemented, spooﬁng a MAC address
will be easy for WiMAX as it is for WiFi.
Replay Attacks. The PKM v.1 authentication protocol is
susceptible to replay attacks since the ﬁrst and the second
message from the SS, and the third message from the BS,
do not provide any freshness with nonce or time-stamping,
nor implement any message authentication scheme. If the
adversary replays any of the three messages the receiver,
either the BS or the SS, cannot determine who really the22 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
senderis.Despitethefactthatreplayauthenticationmessages
attacks cannot expose the strongly encrypted AK, it can lead
though to a severe result. The reason is that if BS has a
timeout value to reject authorization requests (Auth-REQ)
from the same SS within a certain period of time, the rightful
request from the victim SS will be ignored and thereby leads
to Denial of Service (DoS). In case where the BS accepts the
requests, a new AK generation will take place continuously
leading to exhaustion of the BS’s capabilities [27]. In PKM
v.2RSAauthentication,theBSNoncealongwiththeSSNonce
from the second message ensure freshness against replay
attacks on the third message. Nevertheless, a replay attack on
the second message just as described before in PKM v.1 is
possible since the BS cannot realize that the SSNonce is not
fresh. A replay attack can appear in both PKM SA-TEK 3-
way handshake versions. In PKM v.1, a request message sent
from a SS at an earlier time can be constantly replayed by an
adversary,forcingtheBStoreplywithnewTEKkeymaterial,
exhausting thus the BS’s capabilities. Nevertheless, message
replayattackcannotsucceedanytime.Thethreatissuccessful
only if the used for the replay attack intercepted message
had the same AK during the actual time of the attack. That
is, each message is authenticated with an HMAC digest; if
the HMAC KEY U used for the digest during the message
creation, derived from a diﬀerent AK than the current, the
digest would not match and the message would be discarded,
leading thus to a failed replay attack. Unfortunately, AK’s
lifetime ranges between 1 to 70days with default value the
7days, making thus the attack very possible for a long period
of time. In PKM v.2 the replay attack cannot succeed because
of the BSNonce in the SA-TEK challenge message. Since
the fact that the BS sends SA-TEK challenges with diﬀerent
nonce, the adversary cannot succeed if he replays the SA-
TEK request message, because the BSNonce in the replayed
message is not longer valid and thereby, the message will be
discarded from the BS. The data traﬃc is also secure from
replay attacks, since each packet has a 32-bit number (PN)
preventing from repeated packet numbers.
Message Modiﬁcation. Authentication and integrity protec-
tion in each MPDU payload with DES-CBC, AES-CCM,
and additionally AES-CBC for PKM v.2 makes message
modiﬁcationafailedattack.Moreover,managementmessage
authentication with HMAC and CMAC is secured to modi-
ﬁcation. Another weak point appears in the third message
sent by the BS in PKM v.1 authentication procedure where
message integrity mechanism does not exist. A man in the
middle attack is possible to intercept and modify the third
message,causingaseriousDoSattack.Sincethatthemessage
does not have any integrity mechanism the adversary can
modify the encrypted AK and send it to the victim SS. The
SS will decrypt a diﬀerent AK from the initial legitimate
key generated from BS. The usage of the wrong AK key
from the SS will lead to the creation of non-legitimate KEK,
HMAC KEY D, HMAC KEY U keys, and consecutively to
the decryption from the SS of the TEK sent from the BS
with a wrong KEK. As a consequence, the communication
between SS and BS will be impossible, since all management
m e s s a g e ss e n tf r o mS Sw i l lh a v ed i ﬀerent HMAC digests and
they will be discarded from BS and vice versa, and moreover,
the data traﬃc encryption-decryption procedure with TEK
will lead to the impossible revelation of the plaintext. The
problem is ﬁxed in PKM v.2 since the BS uses RSA signature
to ensure the integrity of the message and thereby any
modiﬁcation on the encrypted AK will be known to the
SS, since the signature comparison from the BS and the
signature of the modiﬁed message from SS will be diﬀerent,
and therefore the message will be discarded. Leaving aside
the secure message authentication implemented in WiMAX,
replayandmessageinjectionattacksfaceanotherdiﬃculty—
the timing and the synchronization to inject a message.
The adversary has to ﬁnd an open slot in the schedule
and get prepared for his transmission. Even if the adversary
knows the propagation delay as a part of the initialization
procedure, when he has to inject the message from a
BS, he does not know how much propagation delay will
meet. Moreover, the adversary has to surpass the stateful
characteristic of the WiMAX MAC layer. MAC accepts
messages only at certain times, and thereby, it will not
respond to messages exceeding this period of time [20].
Therefore, the aforementioned diﬃculties make replay and
message injection a very diﬃcult task to do.
DoS Attacks. WiMAX like every wireless network is sus-
ceptible to jamming and scrambling. Nevertheless jamming
can be detected quite easily and cannot aﬀect the network
severely. Scrambling as mentioned, targets selective control
or management messages in order to destabilize the normal
network operation, especially when they are time sensitive
messages such as channel measurement report requests or
responses, which are not delay tolerant. Moreover slots of
data traﬃc can be scrambled, forcing the victim-users to
retransmit. Scrambling though needs to surpass important
technical diﬃculties to be successful. The reason is that
the adversary must interpret control information and send
noise during speciﬁc intervals [15]. As shown in WiFi, a
deauthentication attack leads to serious DoS. In WiMAX
the corresponding message is the Reset Command (RES-
CMD) message, where the SS upon receiving this message
begins complete reset. An exploitation of this message by
an adversary is not possible since the speciﬁc management
message is authenticated, and thus, a serious DoS attack
is prevented. Nevertheless, through the authorization state
machine and the Auth Invalid message, a similar DoS attack
is possible. The Auth Invalid message can be exploited by an
adversary for the ﬂowing reasons.
(i) It is not authenticated and thus can be easily created.
(ii) The message will be accepted from the SS at anytime.
(iii) ThemessagedoesnotutilizethePKMIdentiﬁerserial
number, and therefore the SS will not discard it as a
message with an unmatched Identiﬁer ﬁeld.
Thereby, if the adversary attacks with this message, it causes
a SS transition from the Authorized state to the Reauth Wait
state. When the Reauth Wait timer expires, a Reauth Request
is sent by the SS, requesting another chance to rejoin theJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 23
Table 2: WiFi and WiMAX threat analysis comparative overview.
(a)
IEEE Protocol WiFi
WEP WPA WPA2
P
a
s
s
i
v
e
a
t
t
a
c
k
s
Eavesdropping
Cannot be avoided. Cannot be avoided. Cannot be avoided.
(i) Traﬃc patterns can determine
the content of communication
(Video conferencing, Instant
messaging)
(i) Traﬃc patterns can determine
the content of communication
(Video conferencing, Instant
messaging)
(i) Traﬃc patterns can determine
the content of communication
(Video conferencing, Instant
messaging)
(ii) Station’s and AP’s MAC
address interception
(ii) Station’s and AP’s MAC
address interception
(ii) Station’s and AP’s MAC
address interception
Traﬃc analysis Cannot be avoided Cannot be avoided Cannot be avoided
A
c
t
i
v
e
a
t
t
a
c
k
s
Key cracking RC4 key cracking very possible RC4 key cracking very possible
AES provides safety—No key
cracking possible
User-
Authentication
Breaching
(i) Shared key authentication weak
due to RC4 (Brute force,
dictionary attacks)
(i) Shared key authentication weak
due to RC4
(i) Firmware change leads to
authentication breaching
(ii) Firmware change leads to
authentication breaching
(ii) Firmware change leads to
authentication breaching
(ii) 802.1X very secure
(iii) 802.1X very secure
Masquerading
(Spooﬁng)
(i) Station masquerading (i) Station masquerading
802.1X authentication very strong
but session hijacking is possible
after the 3rd message from the AP
for successful EAP
(ii) AP masquerading (ii) AP masquerading (When
802.1X is not used)
Replay attacks
Yes, no mechanism to prevent
replay attacks
48-bit TKIP sequence counter
(TSC) to prevent replay attacks
48-bit packet counter to prevent
replay attacks
Message
modiﬁcation
attacks
CRC-32 weak to prevent such
attacks
(i) CRC-32 weak to prevent such
attacks
CCMP provides safety in
modiﬁcation attacks
(ii) MIC prevents such attacks on
MSDU
DoS attacks
(PHY layer) Jamming Jamming Jamming
DoS attacks
(MAC layer)
(i) Network block with CSMA/CA
exploitation
(i) Network block with CSMA/CA
exploitation
(i) Network operation blocking
with CSMA/CA exploitation
(ii) De-authentication attack (ii) De-authentication attack (ii) De-authentication attack
(iii) Deliberate CRC errors (iii) Deliberate CRC errors
(b)
IEEE Protocol WiMAX
802.16 802.16e
P
a
s
s
i
v
e
a
t
t
a
c
k
s
Eavesdropping
Cannot be avoided. Cannot be avoided.
(i) Information disclosure of the SS’s location
at certain period of times due to the fact that
management messages are sent in the clear
(i) Information disclosure of the SS’s location
at certain period of times due to the fact that
management messages are sent in the clear
(ii) SS’s and BS’s MAC address interception (ii) SS’s and BS’s MAC address interception
Traﬃc analysis Cannot be avoided Cannot be avoided24 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
(b) Continued.
IEEE Protocol WiMAX
A
c
t
i
v
e
a
t
t
a
c
k
s
Key cracking
(i) With DES-CBC there is possibility of
cracking if TEK
(i) With DES-CBC there is possibility of
cracking
(ii) With AES-CCM, threat if PN-key
combination is used more than once
(ii) With AES-CCM, threat if PN-key
combination is used more than once
(iii) TEK encryption well secured (iii) With AES-CBC, no key cracking possible
(iv) TEK encryption well secured
User-Authentication
Breaching
If network equipment stop being standalone
units, as it is the case now, and instead 802.16
compliant chipsets take their place inside
laptops, as it was announced from WiMAX
forum members, the change of Firmware can
lead to authentication breaching
If network equipment stop being standalone
units, as it is the case now, and instead 802.16
compliant chipsets take their place inside
laptops, as it was announced from WiMAX
forum members, the change of Firmware can
lead to authentication breaching
Masquerading
(Spooﬁng)
(i) SS’s MAC address spooﬁng (i) SS’s MAC address spooﬁng
(ii) Lack of mutual authentication could lead
to BS’s spooﬁng
(ii) Lack of mutual authentication with PKM
v.1 could lead to BS’s spooﬁng
Replay attacks
(i) In PKM authentication, replay attack on the
2nd and 3rd message
(i) In PKM v.1 authentication, replay attack on
the 2nd and 3rd message
(ii) In SA-TEK 3-way handshake replay attack
possible if AK hasn’t changed
(ii) In PKM v.1 SA-TEK 3-way handshake
replay attack possible if AK hasn’t changed
(iii) In PKM v.2 authentication, replay attack
on the 2nd message
Message modiﬁcation
attacks
(i) Message modiﬁcation of the 3rd message in
PKM of the encrypted AK
(i) For data traﬃc integrity, DES-CBC,
AES-CCM and AES-CBC mode ensure safety
on message modiﬁcation attacks (ii) For data traﬃc integrity, DES-CBC and
AES-CCM mode ensure safety on message
modiﬁcation attacks
(ii) The HMAC and CMAC protected
Management messages are safe on
modiﬁcation attacks (iii) The HMAC protected Management
messages are safe on modiﬁcation attacks
DoS attacks (PHY layer)
(i) Jamming (i) Jamming
(ii) Scrambling (on control and management
messages)
(ii) Scrambling (on control and management
messages)
DoS attacks (MAC layer)
(i) Message modiﬁcation of the 3rd message in
PKM
(i) Message modiﬁcation of the 3rd message in
PKM v.1
(ii) Replay attacks on 2nd message in PKM
authentication
(ii) Replay attacks on 2nd message in PKM v.1
and v.2 authentication
(iii) Replay attack in SA-TEK 3-way
handshake, if AK hasn’t changed
(iii) Replay attack in PKM v.1 SA-TEK 3-way
handshake, if AK hasn’t changed
(iv) DoS attacks with Reset Command
(RES-CMD) management message
(iv) DoS attacks with Reset Command
(RES-CMD) management message
(v) DoS attacks with Ranging Response
(RNG RSP) set to value 2 [Abort]
(v) DoS attacks with Ranging Response
(RNG RSP) set to value 2 [Abort]
network. The period of the Reauth Wait timer is measured
in seconds and if additionally an Auth Reject message is
sent at this point, it will lead the SS to the Silent state
where it ceases subscriber traﬃc, responding only to BS’s
management messages [20]. The usage of the Auth Reject
message is achievable since that it is not authenticated as
well. The Ranging Request (RNG-REQ) message is the very
ﬁrst message sent by an SS seeking to join a network where
the SS requests transmission timing, power, frequency and
burst proﬁle information. RNG-REQ is also sent periodically
for SS’s adjustments. Moreover, the BS can use this message
when it demands uplink and downlink channel changing,
power transmission modiﬁcations and ﬁnally, termination
of all transmissions and MAC re-initialization of a SS. ItJournal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications 25
is obvious that if this message could be exploited by an
adversary, it would cause a serious DoS attack. Unfortu-
nately, this message is not encrypted, authenticated and it is
stateless, making it thus a candidate for DoS attack. Thereby,
an adversary can spoof a speciﬁc SS by sending an RNG-RSP
message, with the ranging status ﬁeld set to value 2, which
means “abort” [20]. The SS’s address can be easily obtained
by sniﬃng the channel IDs it uses.
5.3. WiFi-WiMAX Threat Analysis Overview. In this entity
with the aid of the following table (see Table 2) we present a
summaryofthepossiblethreatsthatWiFiandWiMAXcould
face during the network operation.
In WiFi, the establishment of the Robust Security
Network Association (RSNA) with the 802.11i founds the
implementation of a really secure wireless network oper-
ation. The pre-RSNA period with WEP and WPA, and
the implementation of RC4 encryption in the information
conﬁdentiality (privacy) and the user authentication opera-
tion, is not secure and easily can be breached. Additionally,
the CRC32 checksum cannot guarantee the information
integrity of the MPDU’s. Moreover, the often key renewal is
not an easy task because it requires a key method delivery
which is out of the pre-RSNA WiFi operation. On the
other hand, the RSNA period forms a secure operation of
WiFi. The usage of the AES-CCMP encryption scheme in
the conﬁdentiality (privacy) of the information makes key
cracking impossible, The CCMP implementation guarantees
the integrity of the MPDU along with some Additional
Authentication Data (AAD), and the 802.1X authentication
provides secure key management and user authentication
procedure. Nevertheless, due to the nature of the protocol
architecture, the RSNA appears the same weaknesses like
WEP and WPA, with two important DoS attacks:
(i) transmission prevention with the fast and constant
transmissionofshortpackets,takingadvantageofthe
CSMA/CA algorithm operation,
(ii) De-Authenticationattackwhichusestheabilityofthe
MAC address forging with a simple ﬁrmware change.
As mentioned before, WiMAX implements much more
enhanced security mechanisms to prevent any possible
threats. Leaving aside the speciﬁc cryptographic suites that
WiMAX uses, the protocol architecture can be characterized
with two important features: (a) MAC has a connection-
oriented architecture, assigning each slot to a certain con-
nection, each one belonging to various services, like network
management and data transport, all of which implement its
own security parameters, (b) the stateful characteristic of the
WiMAX MAC layer where MAC accepts messages only at
certain times, rejecting thereby messages exceeding a deﬁned
period of time.
The aforementioned characteristics prevent many Denial
of Service attacks, as described in the threat analysis section,
make any connection exploitation and message injection
extremely diﬃcult. In addition to the sophisticated MAC
operation, the WiMAX implemented security mechanisms
enhance even more the network security. It is apparent from
the detailed description of the WiMAX security mechanisms
that user-authentication becomes secure with the X.509
certiﬁcates and the RSA asymmetric encryption, especially
with PKM v.2 where mutual authentication is needed.
Nevertheless, the 802.16 PKM authentication, as shown
before, appears some ﬂaws that could lead to some DoS
attacks. The conﬁdentiality and the integrity with WiMAX
are well secured, although the TEK lifetime could be an
issue when DES-CBC is used for data traﬃc encryption.
Even if some management messages implement integrity
mechanisms with HMAC of CMAC digests, and thus
provide protection on modiﬁcation attacks, the lack of the
implementation to all management messages as shown could
lead to serious DoS attacks. As a conclusion it can be stressed
that WiMAX implements strong security mechanisms, much
more enhanced from WiFi, especially with the 802.160e
standard which is used for full mobility characteristics.
Inthecaseofmobilitythough,animportantissueshould
be determined that concerns the hand-over procedure of a
mobile station. The hand-over mechanism is not deﬁned
in the 802.16e protocol and it is extremely important to
be the fast, secure at the key exchange and the probable
authentication procedure, and ﬁnally, seamless in real-time
applications during the mobile station transfer from one
Base Station to another.
6. Guidelinesfor SecureWiFi and
WiMAX Networks
From the WiFi and WiMAX threat analysis, we concluded
that WiMAX implements stronger security mechanisms and
succeeds to block most of the threats in a wireless network.
Nevertheless some weaknesses still exist in WiMAX as well;
in the following, we will try to identify the recommendations
for WiFi and WiMAX, on how speciﬁc mechanisms should
be used, how speciﬁc security options shall be set and if new
security mechanisms, additional to the ones available with
WiFi and WiMAX, are needed in order for the network will
operate more securely and robustly.
Passive attacks in any wireless network are unavoidable
since all messages are transmitted freely in the air. If
the network is to ensure the conﬁdentiality of the data
traﬃc by implementing strong encryption schemes as it is
recommended later we could minimize the risks of passive
attacks.
6.1. Guidelines for WiFi Networks
6.1.1. WEP Security. Threat analysis showed how insuﬃcient
is WEP security. The possibilities to enhance security are
limited, and if WEP is the only available solution the only
thing that can be done to enhance security is the constant
key renewal is short periods of time (i.e., each day).
6.1.2. WPA Security. The usage of RC4 encryption faces the
same important security issue as described in WEP, even
if TKIP uses a diﬀerent key for each MPDU encryption.
Therefore, conﬁdentiality and user shared-key authentica-
tion could be compromised as well. The only thing that can26 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
be done, as well as in WEP, is the often key renewal in short
periods of times.
In case where WPA can implement the AES-CCMP
encryption-integrity security scheme, it is important to be
the selected choice in order to provide secure conﬁdentiality
and integrity of the transmitted information.
With MIC (Michael) and the TSC operation, WPA
succeeds to protect the integrity of MSDUs and the replay
attack threat.
User authentication is well secured if the 802.1X authen-
tication is to be used.
6.1.3. WPA2. As noted before, the implementation of the
802.11i protocol in WPA2 deﬁnes the Robust Security
Network Association era where WiFi networks can be
consideredverysafe.Theconﬁdentialityistotallyguaranteed
with AES encryption, while integrity is likewise secured
with the CCMP implementation of the AES-CCMP scheme,
where besides the MPDU, some additional authentication
data (AAD) are protected as well. As mentioned with WPA,
the 802.1X authentication ensures secured authentication
procedure.
Nevertheless, as described in threat analysis, 802.1X can
face a serious threat that could lead to a user-authentication
breaching, and to a DoS attack with the transmission of
aD eAuth message (Deauthentication attack). This attack
appears in each WiFi security scheme and the reason is the
lack of authentication in the De Auth message.
Therefore in order to prevent this threat, a modiﬁcation
in the WPA and the WPA security operation can be
implemented when the 802.1X authentication is used. With
801.X and the EAPOL operation, both parties-Station and
AP,possessthe128bitEAPOLKeyConﬁrmationKey(KCK).
Thiskeyisusedfordataoriginauthenticityanditcanbeused
intheDe Authmessageauthenticationinordertodetermine
that the message not only left from the AP with the speciﬁc
MAC address that could be changed as shown before, but
it must have a legitimate digest produced with the KCK key
from the authentic AP, and only the Station can conﬁrm it.
6.2. Guidelines for WiMAX Networks
6.2.1. General Guidelines. WiMAX has already shown some
cryptographic vulnerabilities; some of them can be ﬁxed if the
following issues and speciﬁc cipher suites are followed.
(i) Random Number Generation. Ar a n d o mA Ka n dT E K
generation with the usage of a uniform probability distribu-
tion w i t h o u ta n yb i a si sn e e d e d .S u c hag e n e r a t o rm u s tb e
explicitly deﬁned by the implementation [12]. Additionally,
therandomnumbercouldbeaconcatenationoftworandom
numbers created from the BS and the SS respectively. This
would prevent any possible bias if the random generation is
done only by the BS.
(ii) The Lifetime of Keys (AK, TEK). Since it is understood
that short-time key generations will aﬀect the network
operation by keeping the BS busy more often with key
renewals, the AK can be left at its default value (7 days) and
below since the strong encryption (RSA—public key) is used
and it cannot reveal the AK easily. Similarly TEK’s lifetime
should be set not more than its default value 12 hours. This
is an acceptable lifetime to ensure that TEK’s immunity to
key-crackingisguaranteed.Itshouldbenotedthatincreasing
the lifetime of keys, may have some (relatively small) positive
impact on performance, it does though increase signiﬁcantly
the exposure to key attacks.
The WiMAX forum deﬁnes two system proﬁles; one based
on the 802.16-2004 revision of the IEEE 802.16 standard and
the other based on the 802.16e amendment. The ﬁrst targets
the requirements of the ﬁxed and nomadic market, and is the
ﬁrst to be commercially available. The 802.16e version has
been designed with portable and mobile access in mind, but
it will also support ﬁxed and nomadic access. Thereby, since
the cryptographic suites for two system proﬁles are diﬀerent,
we will also diﬀerentiate the security planning guidelines.
6.2.2. Guidelines for the 802.16-2004 Proﬁle. The following
security mechanisms should be selected for the 802.16-
2004 proﬁle in order to ensure strong authentication,
conﬁdentiality and integrity.
(i) Data Traﬃc Conﬁdentiality and Authenticity. the AES-
CCM mode should be implemented with 128-bit TEKs,
ensuringastrongencryptionmechanism.AdditionallyCCM
provides extra data origin authentication for some data
outsidethepayload.IfDES-CBCmodeistobeimplemented,
though, it is important to generate an IV randomly with a
uniform probability distribution for each packet to ensure
secured encryption.
(ii)TEKConﬁdentiality. Either3DESorpreferablyAES-ECB
willprovidestrongsecurity.RSApublickeyencryptionisnot
recommended due to large computational costs. It can be
implemented though if for some reason the KEK production
or the usage is problematic.
(iii) Integrity. HMAC with SHA-1 is the only applicable
management message integrity mechanism, but ensures
message authenticity.
The following modiﬁcations could enhance the security
oﬀered by the 802.16-2004 proﬁle.
(i)SignatureontheThirdMessage. during authenticationfor
integrity protection with the SS’s RSA public key and SHA-
1 or MD-5 hash algorithm for message modiﬁcation pre-
vention. Additionally, time-stamping in the second and the
third message is required for replay attack protection. Nonce
is not recommended as showed since that the SSNonce in
the second message does not prevent a continuous replay
attack. Even if the computational cost for the signatures and
the time-stamping is increased, it is a onetime procedure for
the whole session and it is imperative to be implemented to
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(ii) Mutual Authentication. solution prevents masquerading
attacks. Therefore, the BS shall present its certiﬁcate within
the third message as in RSA PKM v.2.
(iii) Time-Stamping in SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake. in a
similar way with the authentication procedure, a time-
stamping should be added in the messages to prevent replay
attacks. With this feature, the SA-TEK 3-way handshake will
be secured.
(iv) Authenticated Management Messages. In order to pre-
vent DoS attacks, which cause obstruction in the normal
operation of the management messages, all management
messages should be authenticated.
6.2.3. Guidelines for the 802.16e Proﬁle. The second system
proﬁle, the 802.16e includes all the security schemes that are
implemented in the 802.16-2004 standard proﬁle. Therefore,
all the security enhancements discussed in the previous
section should also be considered with the 802.16e proﬁle in
the case where PKM v.1 is to be used.
The 802.16e has stronger and more eﬃcient security
mechanisms and thereby the PKM v.2 protocol should be
used wherever possible. In this case the security planning
guidelines are the following.
(i) RSA along with EAP. authentication provides strong
security with mutual authentication. The EAP scheme is not
deﬁned within the standard but the EAP-TLS or EAP-SIM
should be implemented. It is recommended that even if
the authentication procedure demands extra computational
cost and time, it must be used because it ensures safe
authentication.
(ii) Data TraﬃcC o n ﬁ d e n t i a l i t y . The AES-CCM or the AES-
CBC mode with 128-bit TEK provides strong encryption.
Additionally, CCM or CBC provides secure data integrity.
(iii) TEK Conﬁdentiality. The AES Key Wrap is preferable
because it is speciﬁcally designed to encrypt key data, and
the algorithm accepts both the ciphertext and the ICV. If it
cannot be implemented, either 3DES or preferably AES-ECB
mode will provide secured TEKs.
(iv) Message Authentication. The hash AES-CMAC value
is the strongest integrity mechanism because except the
management message, it is calculated over additional ﬁelds
like the 64-bit AKID, the 32-bit CMAC PN counter, and the
16-bit connection ID. Thereby it is the preferable solution
for secure message authentication. Of course HMAC can be
selected if AES-CMAC cannot be implemented.
Additional modiﬁcations in PKM v.2 are suggested in the
following areas.
(i) Although RSA in PKM v.2 implements nonce for
the second and the third message, as described in
the section on WiMAX threat analysis, the second
message remains exposed to replay attacks. Time-
stamping must be used instead of nonce in order
to ensure replay attack protection. In additionally,
RSA signatures in authentication messages should be
added to prevent message modiﬁcations.
(ii) All management messages should be authenticated.
Also,itisclearthatthestandardmissestodeﬁneassecure
seamless hand-oﬀ mechanism. In the following we describe
such a mechanism which if implemented will enhance the
security of mobility processes.
7. Open Issues and Conclusions
T h eﬁ r s tt a r g e to ft h i sw o r ki st oa n a l y z ea n dc o m p a r et h e
WiFi and WiMAX wireless network security. An important
conclusion from this comparison is the highly sophisticated
design of the WiMAX networks. An important reason is the
operationalcharacteristicsoftheWiMAXnetworks,covering
largeareasandservingmanymoreusersthanaWiFinetwork
does. Nevertheless, the protection of the information cannot
be relevant to the aforementioned characteristics and every
security mechanism should guarantee it. Therefore, having
WiMAX security as a pattern, it can be said that WPA2
implements similar strong security characteristics and it is
the only secure solution in a WiFi network.
The second target of this work is the threat analysis
of WiFi and WiMAX. The conclusions from this analysis
present similar results as above. In WiFi an important
number of threats can create serious problems, where in
WiMAX most of these threats are prevented. The reason is
the enhanced security mechanisms of WiMAX, along with
theoperationalcharacteristicsofMAClayer.Ofcourse,some
threats are still exist, especially in 802.16-2004 standard.
In addition to the already deﬁned possible threats, in this
work we indicated a weak point in the 802.16 authenti-
cation procedure with the message modiﬁcation attack in
the third message sent from the BS and we propose the
implementation of the 802.16e authentication mechanism in
the guidelines to ﬁx it.
The highest level of security is met in the 802.16e
standard, where most of the 802.16-2004 standard security
issues are ﬁxed, and simultaneously, supports the mobility
feature which is very important in the contemporary way of
life. Nevertheless, it leaves two important matters open as far
as security is concerned. The ﬁrst is the implementation of
the EAP mechanism. As noted, all EAP applications need
to specify mandatory-to-implement algorithms to ensure
security and mutual authentication. The second issue is the
mechanism to ensure soft HO. Even if WiMAX Forum [7]
expects that the initial products will support only simple
mobility with hard HOs, which are less complex than soft
HOs, but they have a high latency and increased energy
consumption. The 802.16e will ﬁnally implement full mobil-
ity, mobile VoIP, and real-time applications. Security issues
remain open for this implementation as pre-authentication
procedure is out of the scope of the standard. Nevertheless,
a seamless, fast and secure way of key management and
transfer during pre-authentication with the aim to avoid a28 Journal of Computer Systems, Networks, and Communications
full repeated authentication procedure, ensuring a smooth
transcend from the serving BS to the target BS, remains an
open matter.
The demand for wireless broadband access is growing
fast and the success is highly dependent on the security it
is provided. The implementation of the security guidelines
for WiFi and WiMAX networks as described before will
prevent any possible threats, enhance and ﬁx indicated ﬂaws,
and form a safe environment where wireless communication
shall be embraced from users.
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